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CHAPTER I

THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
A. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Continental Shelf/ signed. by a majority of
the 86 states attending the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, :from February 24 to April 28, 1958,2
represents the most rapid and successful development of an important
aspect of the law of the sea ever achieved.
Born as a legal concept in the 1945 Truman' Proclamation,3 the
continental shelf doctrine has grown to full stature in a scant fifteen
years. As a new concept in international law it has met with widespread support in the world community of states, and has taken its
place alongside the older and more venerated concepts of "freedom
of the high seas," "territorial sea," and "contiguous zones" as an
established part of the contemporary international law.
By 31 October 1958, the terminal date for signatures to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as well as for the three other Conventions adopted in Geneva at the same time, 4 46 states had signed,
including the United States, Canada, and all of the other large maritime states in the Western Hemisphere except Brazil and Mexico. 5
Especially encouraging is the fact that the U.S.S.R. has aJso signed
1

Adopted 26 April1958, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55.
Following is a complete list of the 46 states signing: Afghanistan, Argentina,
Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Ce~lon, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic), Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti,
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States of
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. For comparative lists of the
52 states which have signed one or more of the four conventions, see Appendix J.
3
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 September 1945, 59 Stat. 884.
4
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L. 52); Convention on the High Seas (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.
53/Corr. 1) ; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54/Add. 1).
6
Since both 1\'lexico ( 1945) and Brazil ( 1950) have asserted claims to their
respective continental shelves, it seems reasonable to assume that they support
the continental shelf concept, even though their disagreement with the exact
language of the Convention has caused them to refrain from signing.
2

8

9

the Convention without reservations, even though she has never issued
a proclamation or decree laying claim to the vast continental shelves
off her coasts. 6 Similarly, although not surprisingly, Soviet bloc
countries have also signed the Convention without reservation.
But the successful development of this newest aspect of the law of
the sea is not to be 1neasured alone in terms of the extent to which the
leading bipolar powers of the world have agreed to the articles of the
Geneva Convention. The really significant fact is that when science
and technology had developed sufficiently to permit the exploitation
of the much-needed resources of the continental shelf, 7 and various
coastal states had begun to assert claims to these resources, 8 the International Law Commission, charged by the General Assembly with
codifying and developing internationallaw, 9 vigorously undertook a
systematic study of this new potential use of the high seas,t 0 concurrently with similar studies by several international associations.11
6

According to recent tabulations by the United Nations Secretariat, 35 states
have formally claimed their continental shelves (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/4
8 Feb. 1960). That the number of claims is not larger is due chiefly to the fact
that many states believe that since the continental shelf belongs to the coastal
state ipso jure, a proclamation or decree is unnecessary. The Convention so
provides in Art. 2 ( 3).
7
For a summary of recent developments in the technology of exploiting the
mineral resources of the continental shelf see Preparatory Document No. 20
of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, prepared by the able
Netherlands lawyer, M. W. Mouton, Rear Admiral, Royal Netherlands Navy,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/25 (1958).
8
The States which asserted claims shortly after the United States Proclamation in 1945 were: Mexico (1945), Argentina (1946), Chile (1947), Peru
(1947), Costa Rica (1948), Honduras (1948), Iceland (1948). See the Synoptical
Table (Appendix K).
9
General Assembly Resolution 174(II), 21 November 1947. Article 15 of the
Statute of the International Law Commission defines the progressive development of international law as "the preparation of draft conventions on subjects
which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which
the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States."
Codification of international law is defined as "the more precise formulation and
systematisation of rules of international law in fields where there already has
been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine." For discussions of the
soundness of these distinctions see Jennings, "The Progressive Development of
International Law and Its Codification," 24 B.Y.I.L. 301 (1947). For the history
of the provision in the Statute of the International Law Commission see Yuen-li
Liang, 42 A.J.I.L. 66 (1948). For an excellent historical survey of the development of international law and its codification by international conferences, see
41 A.J.I.L. Supp. 29- (1947).
10
At its first session in 1949 the International Law Commission placed the
"regime of the high seas" on its provisional list of topics selected for codification.
Report of First Sess. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 4th Sess. Supp. 10,
Doc. A/1925, par.16, item 5 (1949).
11
For example, see the several reports on "Rights to the Sea Bed and Its
Subsoil," International Law, Association Biewnial Report, as follows: 43d Conf.,
607631-61--2

10
An effort was made to formulate a workable set of principles and rules
which would reconcile the claims of the coastal states to the exclusive
rights over the continental shelf resources with the competing claims
of all maritime states to the free use of the high seas for navigation,
fishing, cable and pipeline laying, scientific investigation, and other
uses.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, whatever its deficiencies,12
represents the culmination of a concerted effort to compromise rather
diverse demands of states, each with different geographical features,

Brussels (1948), pp. 168-206; 44th Conf., Copenhagen (1950), pp. 87-138; 45th
Conf., Lucern (1952), pp. 143-179; 46th Conf., Edinburgh (1954). Also see
International Bar Association Report, London (1950), pp. 183-197; Madrid
( 1952) ' pp. 278-285.
12
Opinions of writers vary as to whether the convention has serious deficiencies. Richard Young says, "Nevertheless, despite these substantial merits,
the Convention cannot be regarded as a wholly ,gatisfactory instrument. It is
quite good, but not quite good enough." Young, "The Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf: A First Impression," 52 A.J.I.L. 733 (1958).
Arthur Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, appears
enthusiastic in saying" . . . [T]he Convention on the Continental Shelf .adopted at
the Geneva Conference represents the first worldwide accord on the subject and is
highly satisfactory to the United States." 52 A.J.I.L. 607, 619 (1958). Miss
Marjorie M. Whiteman, a member of the U.S. Delegation and also of Committee
IV which formulated the Convention on the Continental Shelf, seems to feel that
the convention is open to criticism but that it represents a workable document
which will influence "the content and direction of the developing international
law" on this subject. She concludes: "Some may think that the Convention goes
too far; others, perhaps a larger number, may think that it does not go far
enough in certain of its aspects. Of course, whether it does or not is a matter
of opinion; both views may be warranted in some measure." Whiteman, "Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf," 52 A.J.I.L.
629, 659 ( 1958).
Professor Jessup is enthusiastic about the ~success of the entire conference, and
particularly about the Convention on the Continental Shelf. He says: "At
present it seems safe to say that it was a successful conference and that irrespective of the fate of some of the conventions, the Conference achieved enough
clarification and a wide enough measure of agreement to have justified the very
considerable effort." Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea," 59 Columbia Law Review 234 (1959). Of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf he adds : "There are expectations that the Convention on the
Continental Shelf may prove to be the most tangible success of the Conference, . . ." Ibid., p. 251. Also see Jessup, "The Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea; A Study in International Law-Making," 52 A.J.I.L. 730
(1958). Professor D. H. N. Johnson, a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference, while admitting the success of the Conference. is highly
critical of many of the procedures followed and the preparations made. Johnson, "The Preparation of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,"
8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 122, 143 (1959).
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economic conditions, political interests, technological abilities and
legal perspectives. It is a mark of success that the convention was
adopted at all; a further mark of success that the final vote of the
Conference was so overwhelmingly favorable: 57 states voted for the
Convention and only three against, with eight abstentions. 13
Finally, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, even 1nore than
the other three conventions/ 4 may be considered a success in that the
support for the first three of the seven substantive articles was so
strong that the Conference excluded the possibility of any state making reservations to these articles at the time of signature, ratification
or accession. 15 These three articles cover the definition of the continental shelf, the description of the sovereign rights of the coastal
state, and the explicit limitation of those rights in that they do not
affect freedom of the superjacent waters and the airspace above those
"\vaters. 16 Only three of the 46 states signing the Convention filed
declarations or reservations to any of the articles other than the first
three, and these were of minor importance. 17
Of course, whether the Convention on the Continental Shelf will
eventually achieve widespread acceptance in the world community
depends neither upon the number of states which voted for it at the
Conference, nor upon the number signing the convention, but upon

13

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/SR.18, 6 (1958).

14

Ibid., note 1-3a.

15

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55, Art.12 (1958).
Ibid., Art. 1-3.
11
Germany (Federal Republic) filed a declaration with respect to Art. 5,
par. 1 to the effect that in her opinion it "guarantees the exercise of fishing rights
(Fischerei) in the waters above the continental shelf in the manner hitherto
generally in practice." (Mimeographed summary by United Nations Secretariat as to declarations and reservations made to all four conventions and the
optional protocol at the time of signature.) Iran filed a reservation to Art. 4
with respect to the phrase, "the Coastal State may not impede the laying or
maintenance of submarine cables or pipe lines on the continental shelf," saying
that the Iranian Government "reserves its right to allow or not to allow the
laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipe line·s on its continental shelf."
Iran also made a reservation to Art. 6 with respect to the phrase, "and unless
another boundary line is' justified by special circumstances," by saying that the
Iranian Government "accepts this phrase on the understanding that one method
of determining the boundary line in special circumstances would be that of
measurement from the high water mark." (Ibid.) Venezuela also filed a
reservation with reference to Art. 6, declaring "that there are special circumstances to be taken into consideration in the following areas: the Gulf of Paria,
in so far as the boundary is not determined by existing agreements, and in zones
_ adjacent thereto; the area between .the coast of Venezuela and the island of
Aruba; and the Gulf of Venezuela." (Ibid.)
16

12

the number which finally ratify it. This fact will not be known for
some time. As of 12 May 1961, eight states have ratified it.
Moreover, the ultimate proof of the pudding is in the eating, not
in the recipe. The final test of the success of the convention is
whether it serves the purpose of achieving the maximum utilization
of the continental shelf resources with the minimum of friction between the states of the world, and with adequate provision for the
maximum utilization of all other resources of the high seas, including:
navigation, fishing, communication, transportation,. scientific investigation, weapons testing, security, and a host of new emerging uses. 18

B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
SHELF CONCEPT

OF THE

CONTINENTAL

I. Scientific Definition of the Continental Shelf

In reviewing the literature in scientific publications regarding the
continental shelf, 19 and in studying the discussions of the International
Law Commission on the subject, 20 one is convinced that there are almost as many definitions and classifications of the continental shelf
as there are writers on the subject. Particularly, one notes the difference between the geological-geographical definition of the continental
shelf and the legal definition as finally formulated in the Geneva
Convention of 1958.
When geologists, geographers and other scientists use the ter1n
"continental shelf" in a broad sense they mean the submarine extension of the "continent" outward into the sea; a kind of pedestal on
which the continents seem to rest in the ocean, lying "between the
shore and the first substantial fall-off, on the seaward side, whatever
its depth." 21 This submarine plain, which :fringes all of the continents, but at varying widths from the shore, slopes gradually in
most instances out to an edge at which the superja.cent water is approximately 200 meters or 100 fathoms in depth. When this edge is
18

On the potential wealth o.f the seas see Carson, The Sea Around Us (1954) ;
Smith and Chapin, The Sun, The Sea and Tomorrow (1954).
19
Bourcart, Geographie du Fond Des lifers (1949) ; Guilcher, 111orphologie
Littorale et Sous-marine (1954) ; Krummel, Handbuch der Ozeanographie
(1907) ; Kuenen, lJ!larine Geology (1950) ; Shephard, Submarine Geology (1948) ;
Sverdrup, Johnson and Fleming, The Oceans (1942); Umbgrove, The Pulse of
the Earth (1949). Also see United Nations Preparatory Document No. 2, Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/2 (1957), and the citations therein (hereinafter cited as Prep. Doc. 2).
20
See particularly the three principal reports on this subje,c t by the International Law Commission to the General Assen1bly. U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951) ;
A/2456 ( 1953) ; A/3159 ( 19,56) .
21
Bourcart, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 127).
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reached the slope becomes steeper and is referred to as the continental
slope. 22
However, the broad definition of the continental shelf has been
refined in various ways by scientists, some of whom distinguish between "inner" and "outer" shelves, 23 "continental" shelves and "insular" shelves,'24 and "real" shelves and "false" shelves. 25
Perhaps we can best understand what the continental shelves are
from a geological point of view if we visualize for a moment what
the earth would look like if we removed all of the water (hydrosphere) from its surface. We would then see that the earth's crust
(lithosphere) has two predominant features: ( 1) the continents together with their gradually sloping continental shelves, and (2) the
deep ocean basins whose steep-sloping sides are referred to as continental slopes.~ 6 There are six such continents: North America,
22

Following are the definitions adopted by the International Committee on the
Nomenclature of Ocean Bottom Features, published by Wiseman and Ovey,
"Definitions of Features on the Deep-sea Floor," Deep-Sea Research, Vol. I,
No.1, pp.11-16 (Oct. 1953) :
uaontinental Shelf, shelf edge and borderland. The zone around the continent, extending from the low-water line to the depth at which there is a marked
increase of slope to greater depth. Where this increase occurs, the term shelf
edge is appropriate. Conventionally, its edge is taken at 100 fathoms, or 200
metres, but instances are known where the increase of slope occurs at more
than 200 or less than 65 fathoms. When the zone below the low-water line is
highly irregular, and includes depths well in excess of those typical of continental shelves, the term continental borderland is appropriate.
"Continental slope. The declivity from the outer edge of the continental shelf
or continental borderland into great depths·.
"Continental terrace. The zone around the continents, extending from the
low-water line, to the base of the continental slope. . . ." Prep. Doc. 2, p. 4.
23
Umbgrove, op. cit., footnote 19 (Note 5-1 at 98).
24
Prep Doc. 2, p. 4. Also see, Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1, at 104).
25
Krummel, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 105).
26
The experts who prepared Prep. Doc. 2, concluded at p. 5·: "In spite of the
difficulties of defining the borderline between the continental shelf and the
continental slope . . . it is incontestable that the concept of continental shelf
corresponds to a real feature. As a general rule, there exists in fact a shallowly submerged zone along the edge of continents, of which the mean slope
is markedly less steep than beyond, leading to the deep-sea floor. The reality
of this feature can be demonstrated by the percentages of terrestrial surface
occupied by three depth zones of the oceans . . . :
From 0 to 200 metres----------------------------------------- 7.6 per cent
From 200 to 1000 metres-------------------------------------- 4.3 per cent
From 1000 to 2000 metres--------------- - -------- ~ ------------ 4.2 per cent
"Since the area covered by bottoms lying between 0 and 200 metres is only
_ slightly less than that between 200 ·a nd 2000 metres, a range of depth that is
nine times as great, it is evident that the average slope is much steeper beyond
200 metres than nearer shore."
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South America, Europe-Asia, Africa, Australia and Antarctica.
The first five of these continents are surrounded by a more or less
continuous continental shelf of varying widths. Indeed, if the continent o:f Antarctica did not exist we might speak of the continental
shelves o:f the earth in the singular because "all the other continents
lie within the confines of a single encircling belt of shallow water
which is essentially continuous-the continental shelf." ~ 7
The configurations o:f the submarine areas o:f the three oceans
(Pacific, Atlantic and Indian) vary greatly. 28 . Longitudinal ridges
divide the oceans into elongated troughs "\Vhich in turn are often cut
by transverse ridges, thus creating a number o:f deep ocean basins.
Mountain peaks on some o:f the ridges rise almost abruptly out o:f the
ocean depths to :form islands, some o:f which have little or no insular
shelves.
Now, if we poured back :from our mammoth container enough of
the water to fill the deep ocean basins up to the outer edge o:f the
continental shelf we would cover about 128,000,000 square miles, or
approximately two-thirds of the earth's total surface. We would
then have left, high and dry, the six continents including their continental shelves, whose total area would cover approximately
68,500,000 square miles. O:f this total, the continental shelves o:f the
world (including insular shelves) are estimated at approximately
10,500,000 square miles, roughly 18 per cent o:f the 58,000,000 square
miles o:f present dry land areas, an9. about 7.6 per cent o:f the total
ocean areas o:f the world. 29 It is worth observing in passing that
while the stakes are high with respect to exploiting the resources o:f
the continental shelves o:f the world in that these · shelves are equal
to almost one-fifth o:f the land area of the world, the stakes will be
even higher when science and technology discover ways o:f exploiting
the deep ocean basins which are about twelve times the area o:f the
continental shelves.
21

Pratt, "Petroleum on the Continental Shelves," 31 Bulletin of American
Association of Petroleum Geologists, 657 (1947).
28
Sverdrup, Johnson and Fleming, op cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 11).
29
Umbgrove estimates the shelves of the world at 27,500,000 square kilometers,
or 7.6 per cent of the surface of the oceans. Umbgrove, op. cit., footnote 19 (at
99). Also see Sverdrup, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 21).
Calculations here are those of the writer based upon figures given in Sverdrup
et al., pp. 9-15. The total area of the surface of the earth is approximately
197,000,000 square miles. Of this total, the area of the oceans, including adjacent
seas, is approximately 139,000,000 square miles, leaving 58,000,000 square miles
of land mass area. Of the submarine areas under the oceans, the continental and _
insular shelves comprise about 10112 million square miles, with the continental
slopes and deep ocean areas totaling 128,500,000 square miles.
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Then if we poured back the rest of the water remaining in our
container after filling the deep ocean basins, it would spill over those
basins on to the continental shelves up to the shore lines of the dry
land areas of the earth.
From a geological point of view, the present dry land areas of the
world, which are traditionally referred to as continents, are only the
major parts of the continents. More accurately, the continents include the present "dry land" areas totaling some 58,000,000 square
miles plus their continental shelves of approximately 10,500,000
square miles.
Hence, when the continental shelves are defined it is important to
stress this oneness of relationship of the shelves to their continents
by referring to the shelves as the outrward extensions of the continents
covered by comparatively shallow waters which, at approximately
200 meters depth at the outer edges, drop off rather sharply down the
continental slopes into the deep ocean basins. 30
It should be emphasized that the continental shelves do not project
out from the continents of which they are an integral part like huge
awnings hanging from the sides of a building. On the contrary, the
continental shelves are generally the outward parts of a shelving
plain extending inland from the shoreline to the foothills of the continental heights and extending outward from the shoreline under the
ocean waters to the edge of the deep ocean basins. In some parts of
the world, notably off the west coast of South America (in particular,
off the coasts of Peru and Chile), and off the east coast of Africa,
there is practically no continental shelf, the edge of the steep-sided
ocean basin coming almost to the shoreline. This geological fact has
given rise to some legal problems :in connection with the extensive
claims to sovereignty over the high seas by certain South American
countries, notably Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. 31
30

Rutten, ed., "Geological Nomenclator" 7 (1929). The continental shelf
is described as, "the submarine continuation of the continent area up to about
the 100 fathom line." (Emphasis added.) Also see Prep. Doc. 2, which says
at p. 13: " . . . [T]he shelf is a borderline area alternately submerged and exposed a true extension of the neighbouring continents." (Emphasis added.)
31
See Appendix K for a Synoptical Table of Claims to the Continental Shelf.
The problems involved are discussed in detail, infra, pp. 51-58. It is particularly
encouraging to note that although Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have not officially
changed their claims of a 200-mile breadth of continental shelf, including sovereignty over the superjacent waters without reference to the depth of those
waters, all three countries have signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf
_ (see Appendix J). Since Article 3 of that Convention provides that "the rights
of the coastal State over the continental. shelf do not affect the legal status of
the superjacent waters as high seas . . . ," a provision which is contrary to their
previous unilateral claims, it is hoped that by signing the Convention these three

16
All maps tend to give an incorrect perspective of the true continental shelves because they show the shelves as beginning at the shore
lines of the continents, whereas in fact that part of each shelf which
begins at the water's edge and runs out to the start of the ocean basins
at the 200 meter depth is merely the sea ward or underwater part of the
total continental shelf plain. As one geologist has stated:
"The inland upper edge of this plain, an elevation of about
600 feet above sea-level, marks the mean level of the landand-water surface of the globe; its lower edge, at an elevation of about 600 feet below sea-level marks the brink of the
steep continental slope, which descends into the deep oceanic
basins proper. Its outer edge also marks the depth limit of
effective wave ~and current action on the sea floor and the
limit to which sunlight is able to penetrate below the surface
of marine waters." 32
We need not concern ourselves here with the various theories advanced by scientists relative to the origin of the continental shelves. 33
It is essential, however, to any intelligent discussion of the merits of
various legal theories which have been advanced to justify the claims
by states to the resources of their shelves to remember that geologically the continental shelves are as much a part of their respective
continents as are the dry land areas. Therefore, from a geological
standpoint, it is not a question of whether the continental shelves are
important countries, which have so much to contribute >to the orderly development of the law of the sea, have now tacitly withdrawn their exclusive claims
in the larger interest of the maximum inclusive use of the high seas. This hope
is expressed despite the joint declaration by the chairmen of the delegations of
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru during the closing days of the conference, reaffirming
their extensive claims to high seas fisheries: "The reasons which, in recent
years, have led Chile, Ecuador, and Peru to enact certain legislative provisions
and to enter into certain agreements-to which Costa Rica has become a partystill remain valid." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 50.
32
Pratt, op. cit., footnote 27 (note 6-5 at 658) Bourcart also relates the continental shelf and the coastal plains. Bourcart, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at
155-160).
33
For summary statements of the origin of the continental shelves, see Prep.
Doc. 2, pp. 8-10; Umbgrove, "Origin of the Continental Shelves," 30 Bulletin
of American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 249-253 ( 1946) ; The continental shelves have been built up essentially in the following ways: (1) Sedimentation; (2) Erosion, the cutting by waves of land areas and coastal terraces
during times of lowered sea level caused by glaciers on - the continents; (3)
Glacial action; ( 4) Bulging of the continent and concomitant downwarping of
the submerged part; (5) Blockfaulting and folding, of which the most typical
example is found along the southern coast of California.
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contiguous (i.e., near to the continents), as has been suggested,34 but
rather that they are in :fact an integral part o:£ the continents. Geologically, the question is not one o:£ contiguity but o:£ continuity. 85
2. The Problem of Irregularities in the Shelf

Although the above geological description o:£ the continental shelves
is the predominant one, subject to the refinements and special distinctions by some scientists which have been noted, not all shelves :follow
the broad general pattern, a :fact which has been o:£ grave concern to
international lawyers and particularly to the International Law Commission in its deliberations.36
The first problem arises :from the extreme variation in the widths
of the various shelves. The average width :for shelves of the entire
world is approximately 30 miles, but the range is from zero to more
than 800 miles.37 This geological fact has prompted some states with
little or no continental shelves to make extensive claims to the resources of the high seas adjacent to their coasts to "compensate" :for
the lack o:£ shelves.
The second problem results from the :fact that the depth of the edge
o:£ the continental shelf, although generally conforming to the 200
meter or 100 :fathom line, actually varies :from less than 100 meters to
more than 400 meters, even though the unevenness in configuration is
generally not more than 100 meters except in glaciated areas. 38 The
problem facing the International Law Commission and the Geneva
Conference was whether to use an arbitrary figure of 200 meters or
some other figure as the depth o:£ superjacent waters to delimit the
outer edge of the shelf,39 even though any such arbitrary figure would
34

U.N. Doc. A/2456, 14, par. 73 (1953); U.N. Doc. A/3159, 43, par. 8 (1956).
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht uses the terms contiguity and continuity interchangeably in support of the view that contiguity is the valid legal basis for unilateral
claims by states of sovereignty over adjacent submarine areas, and he criticizes
attempts to distinguish between them. 27 B.Y.I.L. 423 (1950).
36
See reports of the International Law Commission. U.N. Docs. A/1858
( 1951), A/2456 ( 1953) , A/3159 ( 1956) .
31
Sverdrup et al., op. cit., footnote 19. Also see Carsey, "Geology of Gulf
Coastal Area and Continental Shelf," 34 Bulletin of American Association of
Petroleum Geologists, 361-385 ( 1950) ; Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (at 105).
38
The Association of Physical Oceanography agreed upon the following definition: "Continental Shelf, Shelf Edge . . . The zone around the continent, extending from the low-water line to the depth at which there is a marked increase
of slope to greater depth. Conventionally its edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or
200 metres) but instances are known where the increase of slope occurs at more
_ than 200 or less than 65 fathoms . . ." Also see Prep. Doc. 2, p. 13.
30
Several proposals were defeated which would have substituted the following
criteria: 200 meters depth but not beyond 100 miles from the outer lin1it of the
territorial sea (Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/1.12) ; 550 meters
35
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often not conform to geological facts, or whether to use some other
criterion, or a combination of criteria. The Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf adopted a combination of criteria, defining the
continental shelf in terms of a 200 meter depth, or "beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the national resources of the said areas . . . . " 40 This delimitation of the shelf may be described as both fiwed and flexible. It is
fixed at the 200 meter depth until such time as science and technology
make possible exploitation beyond the 200 meter ·depth limit, a:fter
which it will become highly flexible and subject to constant change as
technology advances. 41
Finally, in addition to the legal problems arising from varying
widths of the continental shelves and the varying depths of the outer
edge, the International Law Commission and the Geneva Conference
struggled 'vith the problems which arise from the uneven configuration
of the shelves. Within the continental shelves themselves scientists
have found great bas1ns with depths in excess of 200 meters, as well as
plateaus covered by shallow water, making for hundreds of irregularities from the common concept of the continental shelves. 42 Three
categories of depressions have been distinguished: 43
(a) First are depressions that connect with the deep sea beyond
the outer edge of the shelf but over a sill at the level, or nearly at the
level of the shelf floor. A good example of this type is the longitudinal
trough along the coast of Norway which in effect splits the continental
shelf into an inner and outer part. The problem, of course, is whether
the outer part (i.e., the sill) is to be considered a part of the total
continental shelf of the coastal state.
(b) Second are depressions or broad, fiat troughs below the 200
meter depth which do not have a sill in the outer part. T·hese types
predominate off glaciated coasts such as the Cabot Strait Trough,
south of N evvfoundland.
(c) Third are the narrow canyon-like depressions which traverse
the outer edge of the continental shelf, sloping out to the deep-sea
floor.
(Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 19) ; and (United Kingdom, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 24/Rev. 1); 1,000 meters (India, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/C. 4/L. 29), later revised to 550 meters of superjacent waters (U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 29/Rev. 1) ; shelf edg.e or 200 meters (Canada, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 30). Also see Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 12 (at 629, 634).
40
Article 1.
41
For a recent criticism of this ~twofold definition of the continental shelf,
see Young, op. cit., footnote 12 (at 733, 735).
42
Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (at 154, 485 et seq) ; Uinbgrove, op. cit., footnote
19 (at 120).
43
Prep. Doc. 2, p. 14 and Annex thereto, p. 7.
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The problem which arises in situations (b) aiLd (c) above is
'vhether to include the troughs and depressions as part of the shelves,
and if so, how to delimit the claims. The suggestion of adapting the
straight baseline method of measuring territorial waters to the delimiting of the deep submarine shelf indentations "rill not likely
meet with much approval. 44 Nor is such a method necessary in view
of the depth-of-exploitability criterion for determining the extent
of the continental shelf beyond the 200 meter depth.
3. Legal Definitions of the Continental Shelf

In general the legal definitions of the continental shelf have relied
upon the common geological concept of the shelf as the gentle-sloping,
submarine extension of the continent into the sea, the outer edge
of which is at a depth of some 100 fathoms or approximately 200
meters, beyond which the shelf or platform begins a rapid descent
towards the ocean depths.
In the Gidel Memorandum on The Regime of the High Seas, which
the International Law Commission had before it at its second session
in 1950, it was suggested that "it seems advisable for jurists to rely
on the common concept of the continental shelf." 45 The memorandum recounted the fact that the official press release which accompanied the United States (Truman) Proclamation of 1945 46 referred
to the common definition of the shelf as delimited by the 100 fathom
isobath. The virtues of wniformity, fiwity and certitude were emphasized in support of the 200 meter or 100 fathom depth limit. 47
Despite the insistence of several international lawyers and organizations that the common concept of the 200 meter isobath be followed
in describing and delimiting the continental shelf, others objected to
such a precise delimitation and the claims of many states from 1945
to 1950 were not so delimited. 48 Partly for the reason that the International Law Commission wished to define the continental shelf
legally in terms broad enough to ~encompass most or all of the various
claims which had been made, and more particularly because the Commission found that "the varied use of the term by scientists is in itself
an obstacle to the adoption of the geological concept as a basis for
legal regulation of the problem," 49 the Commission departed from
44

45

Ibid., at 16.

U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/32, 50 (1950).
"Press Release, 28 Sept. 1945," 13 Department of State Bulletin 484 (1945).
47
U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/32, 50-51 (1950). Also see Feith, "Rights to the Sea
Bed and Its Subsoil," Report o1 Conference of International Law Association,
-126 (Copenhagen, 1950) .
48
See Appendix K, Synoptical Table of . Claims, particularly the claims of
Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
~ U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17 ( 1951) .
46
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the geological concept in its 1951 draft articles by defining the continental shelf as the submarine areas outside of territorial waters
"where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ewploitation
of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil." 50 This may be
referred to as the depth-of-exploitability definition.
Three things are noteworthy about this 1951 legal definition: (1)
First, is the absence of any depth limit for the outer edge of the
continental shelf; ( 2) second, is the reference to t~1e continental shelf
as being the submarine area outside the area of territorial waters; and
( 3) third, is the use both of the term "continental shelf" and "submarine area." Comments on each of these three aspects of the first
definition by the International Law Commission are necessary for a
clarification of some of the subsequent problems which have arisep.
The ·Commission explained its preference for the depth -ofexploitability test for defining the continental shelf, in preference to a
fixed limit of superjacent waters, such as 200 meters, by saying that
the fixed limit "would have the disadvantage· of instability" because
"technical developments in the near future might make it possible
to exploit resources of the sea bed at a depth of over 200 meters." 51
With respect to the second aspect of the definition in the 1951
draft articles, namely, that the continental shelf is the submarine
area outside the area of territorial waters, this is indeed contrary to
the geological-definition. According to this legal definition, the continental shelf does not begin at the shoreline of the dry-land mass,
but begins at a point from three to twelve miles out from the shoreline, depending upon which width the coastal state has claimed as
defining the limits of its territorial waters. Under this legal definition the continental shelf becomes a sort of submerged ring around
the continent or island, attached to the submarine area under the
territorial sea, which in turn is attached to or forms an outward
extension of the continent or island.
Clearly this aspect of the legal definition does not conform to scientific fact. Geologically the submarine area under the territorial
sea, whatever its width, is as much a part of the continental shelf
as is the submarine area beyond the territorial sea. However, the
Commission justified its exclusion of the submarine areas under the
territorial sea from the definition of the continental shelf by reiterating the long-established law of territorial waters,52 saying that the
60

Ibid., Art. 1 of 1951 Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related
Subjects. (Emphasis added.)
61
U.N. Doc. A/2456, 12 (1953).
52
See . generally, Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927) ; Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911) ; Crocker, Extent of
the Marginal Sea (1919) ; Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries under
International Law (1942).
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"submarine areas beneath territorial waters are, like the waters above
them, subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State." 53
Thus the Commission was differentiating in effect, though not in
the geological sense, between an "inner" and an "outer" shelf ; meaning
by the inner shelf only that part of the total continental shelf (geologically defined) which is under the territorial sea, and meaning by
the outer shelf only that part of the total shelf which is outside of
the territorial sea. This designation of the continental shelf as the
submarine area outside of territorial waters, whatever their width,
\Vas continued by the Commission in its subsequent draft articles of
1953 and 1956 and is now a part of the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf.54
This "legal" distinction between inner and outer portions of the
continental shelf was made by President Ttuman in his famous
proclamation of 28 September 1945,55 in which the United States
claimed the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas-i.e., outside of territorial waters. 56
Subsequently, the Congress of the United States, in resolving the
dispute between the federal government and the individual coastal
states in favor of the states, following the United States Supreme
Court decisions which held for the federal government against
California, 57 Texas,58 and Louisiana,59 clearly distinguished in two
different acts between the inner and outer portions of the total continental shelf as defined geologically. The first of these acts is known
as the Submerged Lands Act, 60 approved May 22, 1953; the other is
entitled the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 61 which became law
53

U.N. Doc. A/1858, 18, Comment 9 (1951).
See Appendix D.
55
59 Stat. 884 (1945) ; 10 Federal Register, 12303 (1945) ; 13 Department of
State Bulletin, 485 (1945).
56
The distinction was also emphasized in the State Department press release
of the same date which explained the Truman Proclamation in part as follows:
"The rapid development of technical knowledge and equipment occasioned by
the war now makes possible the determination of the resources of the submerged
lands outside of the three-mile limit. With the need for the discovery of additional resources of petroleum and other minerals, it became advisable for the
United States to make possible orderly development of these resources. The
proclamation of the President is designed to serve this purpose." 12 Department
of State Bulletin, 484 (1945).
.
57
United States V .. California, 332 U.S.19 (1947).
58
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
59
United States v~Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
60
43 U.S.C.A. pars. 1301-1303, 1311-1315; 67 Stat. 29, May 22, 1953.
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_
43 U.S.C.A. 1331-1343 (Ch. 345-Pub. Law 212), 67 -Stat. 462 (T. 34, par.
524; T. 43, par. 1331 note, 1331-43, Aug. 7, 1953). Continental Shelf-Reserving
and placing certain resources under jurisdiction of Secretary of Interior, 5 par.
485 note. Executive Order No. 9633.
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on August 7, 1953. Section 2 of the latter act defines "outer continental
shelf" as "all submerged lands lying sea ward and outside of the area
of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in Section 2 of the
Submerged Lands Act. . . ." (i.e., all submerged lands outside of
the three mile limit on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and outside the
three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico.).
The third aspect of the 1951 definition of the continental shelf by
the International Law Commission which is worthy of comment is the
use in the definition both of the term "continental shelf" and "submarine area." Because the accidents of geography in the world have
resulted in the generous endowment of some countries with broad
continental shelves while at the same time depriving other countries
of such shelves, and because the term "continental shelf"· is not accurate, geologically speaking, when applied to certain submarine areas
of the world such as those in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Paria
where the depth of the superjacent waters never reaches 200 meters,
or when applied to insular shelves, the International Law Commission
seriously considered the possibility of adopting a term other than
"continental shelf."
Terms suggested were "submarine platform" 62 and "submarine
area," 63 the latter having been used in the British-Venezuela T·reaty
relative to the Gulf of Paria 64 and in the British Order-in-Council
following the treaty. 65 The Commission finally decided to use the
term "continental shelf," giving as its reason, "because it is in current
use and because the term 'submarine areas' used alone would give no
indication of the nature of the submarine areas in question." 66 It is
submitted that the 1951 definition by the International Law Commission in Article 1 was right in boldly using the term "continental
shelf" despite the fact that it was then a relatively new term in
international law. Now, of course, the term is accepted parlance in
62

U.N. Doc. A/CN. 68, p. 4.
Young, "Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath The High Seas," 45
A.J.I.L. 227 (1951). Several states indicated their dissatisfaction with the
term "continental shelf" and suggested a preference for the term "submarine
areas." See Comments by Governments on Draft Articles on the Continental
Shelf and Related Subjects, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/55 (1952). Also see Francois,
"Report on the Regime of the High Seas," U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/60; U.N. Doc.
A/2456, Annex II, 42-72 (1953). See particularly the comments of Belgium
(Ibid., at 42) ; Israel (Ibid., at 59) ; .and Sweden (Ibid., at 65). It is interesting
to note that Mouton entitled his excellent book The Continental Shelf, but
objected to the use of the term, preferring instead the term "shelf" without
the adjective "continental." Mouton, Tlhe Continental Shelf, at 45 (1952).
64
Great Britain Treaty Series #10 (191:2).
65
Order-in-Council, Aug. 6, 1942, Submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria (annexation).
66
U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17, Comment 3 (1951.).
63
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international law circles, notwithstanding the fact that the legal
definition as embodied in the Geneva Convention is at variance in
several respects with the scientific definition.
In addition to the controversy among governments and legal scholars
over the depth-of-exploitability definition of the continental shelf
versus a fixed depth limit of 200 meters or some other depth, it is
interesting to note another variation which was suggested, because
it underlies the unjustified claims of certain Latin American countries
to sovereignty over a 200-mile wide belt of high seas. Yugoslavia
favored not only a depth limit of 200 meters, but also a combination
of this limit with one of width, expressing approval of Mr. El Khouri's
(Syria) proposal of a "minimum boundary 'X' miles from the coast,
regardless of the depth, and a maximum boundary 'X' meters of depth
regardless of the distance from the coast" 67 in order to avoid misunderstandings among neighboring countries. 68
The Yugoslav Government was fearful that unless each country
was given a minimum continental shelf in terms of distance from the
shore, a country with advanced technology could, particularly in the
case of a common continental shelf, extend its claims in terms of its
technology. Hence, the Yugoslav Government argued, a country with
the most advanced technology could claim vast areas of the deep ocean
basins whereas other countries might be limited, because of inadequate
technology, to extremely shallow waters.
It seems clear that the Yugoslav Government's interpretation of
the Commission's language in Article 1, "where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the sea-bed and subsoil," was erroneous. This depth which admits of
exploitation should be interpreted absolutely in terms of the most
advanced technology in the world, and not relatively in terms of the
particular technology of any one coastal state. 69
The whole problem of defining the continental shelf in terms of
67

U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/SR. 113, 18-19. This proposal was defeated by a substantial (7-1) vote in the Commission. (Ibid., at 23.)
68
U.N. Doc. A/2456, p. 71 (1953).
69
In support of this position see Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 42) ; and
U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/60, 102. Young makes an interesting suggestion for keeping
all nations informed of the latest developments in exploitability of the continental shelf: ". . . [I] t might be possible for each party to file periodically
with the Secretary ' General of the United Nations a statement indicating the
maximum depth at which it was exploiting the resources of its shelf. The
greatest such figure~ established to the satisfaction of the Secretary General,
would determine the outer shelf limits for all parties untU the next succeeding
report." Young, "The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First
Impression." 52 A.J.I.L. 733, 735 (1958).
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width was discussed at length by the International Law Commission, 70
particularly in terms of a minimum distance from the coast or from
the outer limit of territorial waters. Two considerations motivated
this discussion : ( 1) an awareness of the fact that certain Latin American countries had framed their proclamations in terms of distance
from their coasts, each claiming 200 nautical miles, regardless of
the existence of any continental shelf in the geological sense, 71 and
(2) the apparent need to make some sort of concession to those countries which opposed the definition in terms of the 200 meter depth
limit because such a definition, without some provision for the coastal
states which had only limited continental shelves, would sharply
circumscribe their claims.
Despite the many arguments against defining the continental shelf in terms of width, the Commission by the narrow margin of six to
five originally voted a concession to the states without continental
shelves by adopting a proposal which read,
"The rights of control and jurisdiction referred to in the
present chapter belong, up to a distance of twenty miles beyond territorial waters, to all the coastal States which do not
possess a continental shelf as defined in article 1." 72
Finally, however, because of the sharp criticism by the minority,
the Commission in 1951 adopted Article 1 without any reference to
width in defining the continental shelf, 73 a policy which was followed
in the 1953 and 1956 draft articles and in the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf.
Several conclusions emerge from the various discussions in the International Law Commission, the Geneva Conference, and among legal
scholars, relative to defining the continental shelf in terms of an arbitrary width. First, since the widths of the shelves vary so greatly,
70

U.N. Docs. A/CN. 4/SR. 66, 26; A/CN. 4/SR. 113, 18-19; A/CN. 4/SR. 117,
10, 19. In the third session of the Commission, Mr. Yepes (Colombia) proposed,
"The rights of control and jurisdiction referred to in the present chapter belong,
up to a distance of twenty miles beyond the coast, to all Coastal States, even
if they do not possess a continental shelf in the geological sense." (Ibid., at 10).
A committee of the International Law Association also argued for a minimum
breadth of 20 miles from the coast. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 66, 26.
71
For citations regarding the claims of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru to a maritime
zone of 200 miles for exclusive exploitation of fisheries, and related developments, see MacChesney, U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation
and Documents, 1956, 264-294, 448, 455, 486 (1957). Costa Rica also followed
the lead of Chile in claiming 200 miles of continental shelf, including sovereignty
over the superjacent waters. U.N. Leg. Series 9, p. 9 (1951L Also see MacChesney, op. cit., 451.
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U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/SR.117, 15.
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U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17 (1951).
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at least when the 200-meter depth lin1it is used either as the geological
or legal norm to 1nark the outer edge of the shelf, an arbitr ary width
criterion is totally unrelated to the norm and hence impracticable.
Second, any attempt to grant all coastal states a minimum continental
shelf in terms of distance from the shore, or from the outer limits
of the territorial sea, in order to "compensate" those states which have
only extremely narrow continental shelves, is completely illogical. 74
Third, suggestions to grant a minimum breadth of continental shelf
in order to permit the coastal state to explore and exploit the resources
of the submarine subsoil from the mainland is unnecessary because
states may now exploit those resources without legal limitation. Such
exploitation is circumscribed only by the limitations of science and
technology. If the tunnels and other devices for exploiting such
resources originate on the continent (or island), interference with
either navigation or fishing is not likely to occur and hence such
exploitation is completely outside the continental shelf problem.
Finally, when the continental shelf is defined in terms of depth-ofexploitability, as well .as in terms o:f the 200-meter depth limit for the
outer edge, as was done in the Geneva Convention, there is no need
to make any provision for a minimum or maximum width of the shelf
area. Under the depth-of-exploitability definition the maximum
'vidth of the shelf capable of exploitation will continue to increase
as tlie world's technology for exploiting the submarine areas improves, whether those areas are -what the geologists describe as the
"continental shelf'' or the deeper, more steeply inclined areas known
as the "continental slopes." For coastal states facing the open oceans
the only real limitation to exploitation will be that of technology.
For states with common shelves-i.e., states whose coasts are opposite each other, or adjacent-the area of exploitability for each state
will be determined and delimited either by agreement or by an equitable .allocation of the submarine areas to the respective claimants
as provided for in the Geneva Convention. 75
When the Commission's 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition, al74

A good summary of the absurdity of the "compensation" theory was that
made by the International Bar Association in London: "This leads to a question
of justicia distributiva. It may be bard on Switzerland that it bas no sea coast
to base a fishing industry upon, as well as it may be bard on Holland that it bas
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75
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ready excoriated by several of the members of the Commission, 76 "\vas
sent out to various governments for comments, it was further criticized. 77 In addition, a number of legal scholars also found fault with
the Commission's 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition. Mouton,
referring with favor to the reason given by the United Nations Secretariat in its 1950 "Men1orandum on the Regime of the High Seas,'>
argued t hat a fixed depth limit "possesses the characteristics of uniformity, fixity and certitude required for legal transactions." 78 Like
Mouton, Waldock felt that the 1951 definition by ·the Commission in
terms of exploitability was too vague and lacked the advantages of a
delimitation of this "new right" by a fixed depth limit. - He said,
"This definition is extremely vague, being open to subjective interpretations by the coastal States which might result
in very large claims." 79
The United States, on the other hand, found no serious fault with
the 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition, expressing "general agreement with the principles which appear to inspire the draft articles." 80
However, in view of the many criticisms by various governments
and writers of the 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition of the continental shelf, Mr. Francois, in his fourth report on the regin1e of
76

Perhaps the strongest critic on the Commission of the whole concept of the
continental shelf was Georges Scelle (France) who considered it a legal fiction.
(U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 117, 19) His two main objections to the continental
shelf doctrine were : ( 1) the uncertainty of what is included in the so-called
continental shelf since, geologically there are often several submarine platforms
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Droit International362, (1955).
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Comments by Governments on Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and
Related Subjects. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/55 (May 1952). Also see Francois,
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the International Law Association, Lucerne, 148 (1952).
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the high seas, proposed the adoption of a 200 meter depth limit, 81
explaining that the criterion of exploitability had been widely criticized "for not laying down a fixed limit, and the view had been expressed that a depth of 200 metres should be adopted." 82
Mr. Francois' fourth report, together with the comments by the
various governments on the 1951 provisional draft articles, were carefully analyzed by the Commission at its 1953 sessions in Geneva.
Despite some vigorous dissents to the effect that the Commission
should not reverse its earlier (1951) decision and revert to a geological
definition 83 because the criterion of exploitability was "more flexible,
and should be maintained," 84 and because "if a geological definition
was now adopted, states like Chile and Peru, which had no continental
shelf in the geological sense of the word, would be placed at a serious
disadvantage," 85 and also because the "possibility of exploiting natural resources at a depth greater than 200 metres must be envisaged," 86
the Commission yielded to the criticisms of its 1951 definition and
adopted the 200 meter depth limit.
Thus the Commission had returned to the common geological concept of the continental shelf with a fixed depth for the superjacent
waters as marking the outer edge of the shelf. Supporting the 200
rneter depth limit in preference to the depth-of-exploitability definition, Mr. Lauterpacht (later Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a judge on the
International Court of Justice), said,
" . . . an exact limit has the merit of clarity, which is extremely desirable, since in matters pertaining to the continental shelf some governments are inclined in addition to
legitimate assertion of right, to make others." 87
He made critical reference to the extensive claims which had been
made by certain South American countries to sovereignty over resources of the high seas, saying, "this association of the assumption
of title over submarine areas with sweeping claims to sovereignty over
the high seas is mischievous in its results and must therefore be a
cause for regret." 88
81
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At its eighth session in 1956 the Commission adopted a definition
which co1nbined the 200 meter depth limit with the 1951 depth-ofexploitability criterion, saying,
". . . the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring to the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of
200 metres (approximately 100 :fathoms), or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas." 89
This is the definition which was adopted by the Geneva Conference
'vith only two slight modifications.90 The first modific~tion was the
elimination of the parenthetical expression "approximately 100
fathoms." The second was the addition of a sub-section, based upon a
proposal by the Philippines,91 which provides that "continental shelf"
also includes "insular shelf." 92
A careful analysis of the n1any discussions in the I.nternational Law
Commission sessions of 1951, 1953 and 1956, and of the discussions in
Committee IV and the plenary meetings of the Geneva Conference,
suggests that the final definition of the continental shelf which was
cast both in terms of a fixed outer limit (i.e., 200 meter depth of superjacent waters) and a flewible outer limit ( depth-of-exploitability even
beyond a 200 meter depth) is an understandable compromise between
divergent views in order to arrive at a definition which would be acceptable to a majority of states and yet recognize the views of the
minority states, many of which are located in areas of the world
89

U.N. Doc. A/3159, Art. 67, 41 (1956).
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where the geological formations do not conform to the usual pattern
of the continental shelf. 93
By stating the 200 meter depth limit first in the definition and emphasizing it, both the International Law Commission's 1956 articles
and the Geneva Convention stress the fact that the legal definition is
based predominantly upon the scientific definition of the continental
shelf. Moreover, the 200 meter depth limit has the advantage of being
precise and certain, and is probably quite adequate for the next decade
or more in view of the present state of offshore exploitation technology
and the anticipated developments thereof. 94
Then, by adding the alternative criterion o£ exploitability even
beyond the 200 meter depth of superjacent waters, the Commission's
articles and the Geneva Convention wisely took cognizance of several
facts. First is the scientific fact, as explained previously, that the
outer edge of the shelf is often found at depths considerably in excess
of 200 meters, even though this figure is a good working average.
Hence, by using the alternative depth-of-exploitability criterion, a
coastal state is not deprived "arbitrarily of so obvious a part of its
continental shelf." 95 Second, is the fact that a coastal state not only
has sovereign rights over its continental shelf but, as advancing offshore technology permits it to exploit the resources out to the 200
meter edge of the shelf and beyond that into the greater depths of
the continental slope, it also has sovereign rights beyond the geologi93
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cal edge of the shelf, 96 delimited only by technological developments
and by the median line which separates common continental shelves
of states opposite, or adjacent to, each other. Third, is the fact that
the continental shelf is an integral part of the continent (or island)
and that the coastal state is best able to exploit the resources of its
continental shelf, broadly defined, whatever the depth of the superjacent waters, in the interest of maximum developm.ent and utilization
of the sea bed and subsoil resources for the benefit of all mankind.

C. CLAIMS TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF RESOURCES
1. Early Claims to Sea Bed and Subsoil Resources

Despite the fact that one may not be sure exactly how many centuries ago the first claims were made to some of the resources of what
we now call the sea bed of the continental shelf, one may infer that
it was ,at least as early as the sixth century B.C. 97
In modern times one of the first legislative acts claiming exclusive
control over the sea bed resources (i.e., sedentary fisheries) was the
British Colonial Act of 1811 which asserted dominion over the Ceylon
pearl banks far beyond the three mile limit. 98 It authorized the
seizure and condemnation of any boat found within the limits of the
pear1 banks or hovering near them and the anchoring of vessels in
the vicinity was also regulated. At later dates similar additional
regulations were issued by the British Colonial Office. 99
Legislative action was also taken by Australia on several occasions
from 1881 to 1898 for the protection and regulation of the sedentary
00

In its commentaries to the 1956 articles, the I.L.C. said, "While adopting, to
a certain extent, the geographical test for the 'continental shelf' as the basis of
the juridical definition of· the term, the Commission therefore in no way holds
that the existence of a continental shelf, in the geographical sense as generally
understood, is essential for the ex·ercise of the rights of the coastal State as
defined in these articles . . . exploitation of a submarine area at a depth exceeding 200 metres is not contrary to the present rules, .merely because the area is
not a continental shelf in the geological sense." U.N. Doc. A/3159, 41 (1956).
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Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and JJ!aritime Jurisdiction 15 (1927).
Also see the interesting and much-cited article, Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the
Sea?, B.Y.I.L. (1923-24), at 34. On p. 37 he says: " . . . [t]he rights of the
Crown in the bed of the sea must have been fixed at least as early as the thir-teenth century."
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Legislative Enactments, Ceylon, 1707-1879, Regulation No. 3 of 1811 for the
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fisheries in Western Australia. 100 Whether this legislative action, and
that taken with respect to sedentary fisheries off Queensland/ 01
applied to the sea bed beyond territorial waters is in dispute. According to Riesenfeld/ 02 J essup/ 03 and others/ 04 it did operate to give the
coastal state control of the sedentary fisheries over a wide area of the
high seas well beyond territorial waters.105
Other states have also regulated sea bed resources beyond territorial "\Vaters (i.e., sedentary fisheries) for more than a century. 106
Ho,vever, one may conclude from an examination of the legislative
acts and treaties, and from the few cases involving disputes over
sedentary fisheries that the legal difficulties arising out of conflicting
claims to sea bed resources beyond territorial waters have been infrequent and have been resolved rather easily.107
The purpose of this brief resume is not to present an exhaustive list
of all of the claims which have been made by states for several
centuries, and particularly during the last century, to the sea bed
resources of "\vhat we now refer to as the continental shelves. Rather,
the purpose is to underscore the fact that for centuries man has been
concerned to a modest extent-meaning ·within the limits of his
100
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existing technology and consonant with his needs--with the exploitation and control of so1ne of the resources of the sea bed, both within
and without territorial waters. Further, it has been our purpose to
emphasize the fact that historically states have generally recognized
the priority of the coastal state to exclusive rights over the sedentary
fisheries resources of the sea bed beyond the limit of territorial waters,
particularly where there has been effective and continued use. 108 Continued recognition of this priority of the coastal state to the sedentary
fish on the continental shelf is articulated in the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. 109
In contrast to the claims of states to the sea bed resources of the
continental shelves which go back several' centuries, claims by states
to the subsoil resources of the continental shelves are of fairly recent
origin. The first such claim was made only a century ago. On 2 August 1858, Royal Assent was given to an act in England called the
Cornwall Submarine Mines Act, which declared that all mines and
rninerals below low water mark under the ~pen sea, adjacent to, but
not being part of the County of Cornwall, were, as between the
Queen in right of Her Crown and the Duke of Cornwall, vested in
the Queen "as part of the soil and territorial possessions of the
Crown." 110
This Act was the outgrowth of a dispute bet,veen the Crown and
the Duchy of Cornwall as to the ownership of minerals derived from
the mines beneath the water on the coast_of Cornwall. The dispute,
which was finally settled by arbitration in the case of Rex v. K eyn, 111
Fulton, op cit., footnote 52 (at 697) : "They (sedentary fisheries) may be
very valuable, are generally restricted in extent, and are admittedly capable of
being exhausted or destroyed . . . and international law also recognizes in
certain cases a claim to such fisheries when they extend along the soil under the
sea beyond the ordinary territorial limit." Also see Hurst, op. cit., footnote 97
(at 40-41) : "The pearl and chank fisheries in the Gulf of 1\rlanaar were claimed
from early times by the successive Portuguese, Dutch and British masters of
the neighbouring territory, and there can be little doubt but that a good title
to the ownership of these beds can be made out, based on long-continued
occupation."
109
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55, Art. 2 ( 4) (1958). Art. 2 ( 4) provides: "The
natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other
nonliving resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organis111s which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under .the sea-bed or are unable to move
except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil."
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culminated in a law which gave effect to the arbitral award. 112 Since
there is no indication in the Act of the outward limits of the 1nines
belo\v lo·w water mark, one may infer that they could extend as far
into the subsoil of the high seas as technology would permit.
Other underseas mines, principally coal, which represented 19th
century claims by states to subsoil resources of the continental shelves,
although often not extending beyond the limit of territorial waters,
\Vere those of Australia, Canada, Chile and Japan, as \vell as 1nany
others in England besides the Corn wall mines.113 These clai1ns were
based upon the recognized right of a coastal state to occupy the subsoil under the high seas by the extension of mining installations whose
entrance was located on the coastal state or in the territorial waters
thereof. 114
Were these 19th century claims to the submarine subsoil resources,
and the earlier claims of states to resources of the sea bed (i.e., sedentary fisheries), precursors of the present day continental shelf proclamations? It is submitted that they were, 115 despite obvious differences between the early claims to the resources of the sea bed and
subsoil and those of the mid -twentieth century. These differences
1nay be summarized briefly.
(a) Differences in terrninology. The 19th century and anteced112

The arbitrator's award gives no reason for deciding that the minerals
obtained from workings below low water mark belong to the Crown. The award
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ent claims did not use the term "continental shelf" because it had
not yet been invented. By contrast, the 20th century claims generally
use the term "continental shelf," although some have not done so.
(b) Differences in interference with freedom of the seas. The
19th century claims, and earlier ones, to the resources of the sea bed
and the subsoil, generally speaking, did not interfere with the freedom
of the seas because the exploitation methods used involved no installations in the high seas. Sedentary fisheries were harvested by ships
and minerals were exploited via tunnels originating on the land-mass.
Of course, laws such as the British Colonial Act of 1811, referred to
earlier, did prevent other States :from harvesting sedentary fisheries
and excluded their ships from the pearl banks.
By contrast, however, the exploitation o.f the continental shelves
today, mostly for oil, often requires the building of installations
attached permanently to the sea bed and the subsoil of the shelf
which project above the surface of the high seas and of necessity
involve some interference with the unfettered use of the seas by
other states :for navigation, fishing, cable and pipeline laying, scientific research and other purposes. Because of this possible interference by the coastal state through its exploitation of the continental
shelf, with the free use of the seas by other states, the International
Law Commission's draft articles and the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf contain provisions against such interference if it is
unjustifiable. 116
(c) Differences in emtent of claims. The claims were modest a
century or more ago because the knowledge of the sea bed resources
and particularly of the subsoil resources was meager. Moreover, the
technology available for their exploitation, as well as the needs of the
states, were limited. By contrast, the claims in the mid-twentieth
century .are great because the needs are great, and our knowledge and
technology are far advanced, even though still considerably short o:f
what is required to exploit the continental shelves at their outer edges
where the depth of the superjacent waters is 200 meters or more. 117
116

Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55,
Art. 3-5 (1958) ). Art. 4 provides that the exploitation of the continental shelf
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or by the purchase of Alaska." Annual Report, Secretary of Interior 1945,
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2. Early 20th Century Claims to Continental Shelf Resources

The first claim during the 20th century to continent al shelf r esources was that of the Portuguese Government in 1910 which issued
a decree regulating fishing by steam vessels.118 The year 1916 witnessed both an official claim by a state and an unofficial expression of
interest in the resources of the continental shelf. However, the claim
was to certain islands on the continental shelf, rather than to the
sea bed or subsoil, and the expression o£ interest was in pelagic fisheries in the superjacent waters, not unlike some o£ the recent claims
o£ Latin American countries.
The expression o£ interest was unofficial, the Spanish oceanographer
Odon de Buen urging at the National Fishery Congress in Madrid in
1916 that the territorial sea be extended to encompass the whole o£
the continental shelf in order to conserve the fisheries.119 H e viewed
exclusive control (i.e., sovereignty) by the coastal stat e as the only
effective means o£ conservation and protection o£ fisheries :from destructive, competitive exploitation. Some thirty year s later the United
States proclamation on fisheries stressed a similar need £or coastal
states to establish fisheries conservation zones, but not by extending the
terri to rial sea.120
The official claim in 1916 was that o£ the Imperial R-u ssian Government, which informed other governments that she considered the
uninhabited islands north o£ Siberia as an integral part o£ Russia
because they were located on and formed "a northward extension o£
the continental platform o£ Siberia." 121 This same claim was later
reasserted by the Government o£ the U.S.S.R. in a special memorandum issued on 4 November 1924 to the governments o£ all states.122
118
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Does this Russian declaration o£ 1916, reasserted in 1924, represent
an adumbration of the present continental shel£ doctrine? It seems
logical to argue that it was not £or two reasons: First, the Russian
claim was to islands (i.e., dry land mass) rather than to the resources
o£ the sea bed and subsoil o£ the continental shelves. Secondly, the
basis £or the claim was not the continental shel£ theory but the sector
theory which was subsequently elaborated by a Soviet writer.123
Professor Francois, in his Report on the Law o£ the High Seas to
the International Law Comrnission,124 argues that the term "continental
platform" as it appears in the Russian declaration of 1916 is not used
in the same sense as it is today. Said he,
"The rights claimed by the Soviet Union in polar waters
should . . . be considered in relatiorr to the 'theory o£ sectors'. . . . The Soviet Government has not submitted any
claims on the basis o£ the 'continental shel£' theory nor has
it replied to the claims o£ other States." 125
That the claim o£ the Russian Government in 1916, repeated in
1924, to islands on the northern "continental continuation" o£ Siberia
is based upon the sector theory, rather than upon the continental
shel£ theory is further corroborated by the United Nations Secretariat's Memorandum on the Soviet Doctrine and Practice with
Respect to the Regime o£ the High Seas (1950), which refers to an
"extension o£ the 'sector' principle declared as governing Soviet
claims to territory in the Arctic Ocean." 126
The next event which might be considered as an expression o£ interest in the resources o£ the continental shelf occurred in 1918 and
involved the State Department o£ the United States. To some extent
123
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it was an expression of disinterest by the United States in the continental shelf.
An American citizen, believing that oil lay in the subsoil of the
Gulf of Mexico at a distance of about forty miles from land on a reef
'vhere the water was less than one hundred feet deep, wrote to the
State Department to inquire whether it would be possible to acquire
property or leasehold rights to the particular tract of ocean bottom
in order to be protected in an effort to obtain oil. The American suggested that an artificial island might be erected and he inquired
whether such an island could be brought under the jurisdiction of
the United States. 127
The State Department informed the American that "the United
States has no jurisdiction over the ocean bottom of the Gulf of Mexico
beyond the territorial waters adjacent to the coast." 128 However,
although the above language did not indicate much interest, the rest
of the letter suggested that the United States did have a veiled interest
in such resources and possibly "would assume some sort of control over
the island" if one were built by the United States citizen. 129
The year 1935 saw another expression of the American attitude
toward the continental shelf. In the face of the Japanese threat to
engage in salmon fishing off Alaska, the Copeland Bill ( S. 3744) was
passed by the Senate, which purported to extend the jurisdiction of
the United States to
". . . all the waters and submerged land adjacent to the coast
of Alaska . . . and lying within the limits of the continental
shelf having a depth of water of 100 fathoms, more or
less." 130
Although the Copeland Bill went no further than the Senate, it
represents a precursor of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 regarding
fisheries and may have influenced to some extent the formulation of
the present continental shelf doctrine.
3. Mid-Twentieth Century Claims to Continental Shelf Resources

a. United Kingdom-Venezuela Treaty of 1942
The first modern -day claim by states to the resources both of the
sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf as de fined in the Geneva
Convention wa~ the treaty between the United Kingdom and Venezuela of .26 February 1942, relating to the sub1narine areas of the
127
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Gulf of Paria located between Venezuela and the Island of Trinidad. 131
This treaty foreshadowed the Truman Proclamation of 1945, and
many of the other decrees and proclamations which followed, in that
it contained no claim to "sovereignty" over the submarine areas of the
gulf, although it used language which, like the Truman Proclamation,
was equivalent to a declaration of sovereignty. 132 Similarly, the
treaty foreshadowed many of the subsequent decrees and proclamations in recognizing that the exploitation of the submarine areas
should not affect the freedo1n of the superjacent high seas.
b. The Truman Proclamation of 1945
Notwithstanding the importance of the United Kingdom-Venezuela treaty, the real beginning of the continental shelf doctrine is
the Truman Proclamation of 1945.133 Most of the subsequent claims
by states to their continental shelf resources refer to the Truman
Proclamation, either directly or indirectly, and any expansion of the
continental shelf concept must be judged in the light of this original
proclamation.
·
The Truman Proclamation was a ·formidable document. It laid
claim to a greater submarine area than any other claim in history
and one which, in view of the advanced state of technology in the
United States for the recovery of oil from underseas areas, gives some
prospect of extensive realization of these important resources. Moreover, the proclamation is important because it represented the first
expression of a philosophy in regard to the continental shelf, abbreviated and incomplete though that philosophy was.
The proclamation asserts in the first three of the four introductory
recitals the raison d'etre justifying the exclusive claim by a coastal
state to its continental shelf. The first three recitals declare: (1) the
awareness of a long-range, worldwide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals ; ( 2) the existence of these needed resources
under the continental shelf and the technological feasibility of their
exploitation either now or in the near future; and ( 3) the need for
some recognized jurisdiction over these resources in the interest of
their (a) conservation and (b) prudent utilization.134
Discussions of the Truman Proclamation and the many other
claims which followed shortly thereafter, are often confused and
confusing because they fail to differentiate clearly between statements
in the claims of conditions as distinguished from preferences (i.e., ·
British Treaty S eries, No. 10 (1942).
Shelf," 23 B.Y.I.L. 333 (1946).
131
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goals of the coastal state and the world community) . Moreover, the
discussions often blur the lines between doctrine and practice and pay
too little attention to alternatives, both in goals and in the methods
for achieving the goals. The analysis here will attempt to differentiate these several facets of the total problem.
The first recital of the Truman Proclamation is in terms of a
conditiorn viewed from the ·world community perspective (i.e., the
"'vorld-,vide need for new resources"). Nothing is said in the first
recital about the need of the United States or any other coastal state
for these new resources, although such need is clearly implied. Nor
is the need expressed in the proclamation in terms of the required
resources o:f the free world bloc vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc, largely, one
Inay assume, because at the time (September 1945) the cold war had
not set in nor had the cleavage of the bipolar world become so
apparent.
The second recital, like the first, was also stated in terms of
conditions (i.e., the existence of needed resources and the technology
to exploit them). By implication, at least, these conditions were
stated in terms of the world perspective rather than from the perspective of a single state. There was no suggestion that only the continental shelves of the United States contained petroleum and other
needed minerals, nor was there a suggestion that only the United
States had the necessary technology for their exploitation, despite the
known leadership of the United States technology in this field.
The third recital, unlike the first two, expressed a preferenc·e
for values in terms of the previously stated conditions. It postulated
a preference for "recognized jurisdiction over these resources" meaning an ultimate recognition by the world community of the right of
the coastal state to the jurisdiction over continental shelf resources,
thei:c extent and limits nowhere defined, because of the stated preferences for order in conservation and prudent utilization.
The fourth recital in the Truman Proclamation is of sufficient importance to warrant stating it in its entirety:
"Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United
States of America that the exercise of jurisdiction over the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the Continental
Shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, (1)
since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these
resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore, (2) since the Continental Shelf may be
regarded as an emtension of the land mass of the coastal nation
and thus naturally appurtenant to it, (3) since t hese resources frequently form a seaward emtension of a pool or
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deposit lying within the territory, and ( 4) since self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over
activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for
the utilization of these resources; . . . ." 135 (Emphasis and
numbers added.)
It will be noted that this fourth recital begins by saying that it
is the United States view that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
and just. Reasonableness and justice are recognized general norms in
international law. Their invocation in support of the United States
claim is justified. However, it is surprising that the United States
did not rely upon one or more 'of the sources of international law as
set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, in addition to the general norms of reasonableness and justice.
International custom could have been invoked in vie·w of the long
history of claims by coastal states to sea bed and subsoil resources as
summarized above. Moreover, although it was recent, the AngloVenezuelan treaty of 1942 might have been referred to. Instead, the
United States proclamation argued the present reasonableness and
justice of coastal jurisdiction largely in terms of physical, technological, and political conditions, as well as in terms of state preferences
:for wealth, power, and security, even though the terms wealth, po·wer
and security were not used to describe the values at stake.
The United States proclamation of 1945 says that the exercise
by the coastal state of jurisdiction over the continental shelf "is reasonable and just," which suggests a statement of what the law is,
thereby justifying the assertion of the claims to the resources. How·ever, the failure to invoke any of the customary sources of international
law in support of the "is" leads to the conclusion that the statement
really amounts to either (1) an expression of what the law in regard
to the continental shelf would be if other states followed the lead of
the United States and thereby developed a customary international
law of the continental shelf, or (2) an expression in 1945 of what the
law ought to be, after considering all relevant policies and variables
in context and after projecting within the limits of human errors of
foreseeability.
It is not suggested that the decision-makers who drafted the
United States proclamation should have invoked some of the recognized sources of international law in8tead of promulgating the reasons .
why the coastal state should have control and jurisdiction (or "sovereignty" as the less timid have called it) over its continental shelf, but
rather these sources should have been delineated in the proclamation
135
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in addition to the description o:f the physical, technological and power
conditions in the world and the statement o:f preferences.
I:f the United States proclamation had been predicated essentially
upon established sources o:f international law, particularly upon
"customary international law" which has long recognized the right
o:f coastal states to exercise sovereignty over subn1arine subsoil resources beyond coastal waters to the extent of existing technology,
and over sea bed resources (sedentary fisheries) under a custon1 going
back many centuries, several desirable results might have ensued
there :from: ( 1) some o:f the claims promulgated after the United
States proclamation might have been both clearer and more moderate;
(2) n1uch o:f the confusion which has attended n1any of the deliberations o:f the International Law Commission and other international
legal bodies might have been a voided; and ( 3) the basis for a great
deal o:f the criticism o:f the United States proclamation and of the
'vhole concept o:f the continental shelf might have been removed in
large part.
This is not to suggest that states cannot justifiably take action :for
the purpose o:f securing for themselves values 'vhich they desire unless
they invoke some existing doctrine or practice to justify their action.
The need :for action to secure values must never be shackled and iinmobilized merely :for want o:f existing legal prescriptions. A decisionmaker is not to be confined, in the determination o:f the la 'v:fulness o:f
his action, or proposed course o:f action, to the precedents o:f prior
international conventions or prior international custom, but "may
draw creatively upon a great variety o:f principles, precedents, analogies, and considerations o:f :fairness." 136 But when, as here, prior
doctrine and practice of states with respect to the exploration and
exploitation o:f the resources o:f submarine areas 'vere at hand, the
United States proclamation should have invoked them.
Nor is it being suggested that the decision-makers who drafted
the United States proclamation were incorrect or unwarranted in their
indication o:f preferences, and in their recital o:f physical, technological
and political conditions to justify the reasonableness o:f a coastal
136
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state's exercise of jurisdiction over the resources of the sea bed and
subsoil of its continental shelf. On the contrary, the assertions 'vere
quite accurate, as the following analysis of the expressed language in
the fourth recital of the Truman Proclamation demonstrates.
( 1) Assertions:
(a) "The effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve
these resour ces would be contingent upon cooperation and protection
from the shore." This statement of a condition regarding technology
and exploitability of submarine resources is a recognition of the fact
that technological and economic considerations make impracticable the
exploitation of the resources without considerable cooperation from
the shore. Shore-based operations for the building of offshore installations and maintaining and supplying such installations, as well
as shore-based pumping stations to service pipelines fr~m the offshore
drilling platforms, would be necessary. While, admittedly, it would
be possible for an overseas state to build and service high seas drilling
platforms, it 'vould be far less practicable than for the coastal state
to do so.
From the standpoint of legal theory and prior doctrine this
part of the proclamation impliedly, though not expressly, suggests
that proximity of the coastal state to the continental shelf is more
conducive to "effective occupation.''
(b) "The Continental Shelf may be regarded as an extension
of the land mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant
to it." This statement of conditions as to the physical universe is
geologically correct. It is unfortunate that the International Law
Commission did not include this concept of the "extension of the htnd
mass" in its definition of the continental shelf in 1951, 1953 and 1956.131
However, in fairness to the Commission, in justifying the coastal
state's claim to the continental shelf the comments following the final
draft articles did recognize the oneness of the land mass and the continental shelf, saying:
"Neither is it possible to disregard the phenomenon of geography, whether that phenomenon is described as propinquity, contiguity, geographical continuity, appurtenance or
identity of the submarine areas in question with the non-submerged contiguous land." 138
(c ) "These resources frequently form a sea ward extensioil
of a pool or deposit lying within the territory." Again, the stateme.nt
U.N. Doc. A/ 1858, 17 (1951); U.N. Doc. A/2456, 12 (1953); U.N. Doc. A/3159,
41 (1956).
138
U.N. Doc. A/3159, 43 (1956).
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of conditions of t he physicalr:ni Ycrse is geologically correct. A strong
reason for granting the coas~al state exclusive rights to the resources
of its continental shelves is t o fo~~estall "whipstocking" 139 of domestic
oil pools beyond territorial 'Yaters by overseas states. Of course, the
problem of "whipstocking" must still be solved in those areas where
one or more nations have common continental shelves.
(d) "Self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close
'vatch over activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary
for the utilization of these resources." Implicit in this statement is
an awareness of the world power process and the inherent threat to
peace and freedom in the world community. To this extent it is a
statement of conditions 'vhich justify, at least as one alternative
method, .a coastal state's control and jurisdiction over its continental
shelf and the resources thereof.
That the International Law Commission was also aware of
the same conditions of insecurity in the world and the need arising
out of those conditions for the coastal state to exclude foreign states
from building installations on the coastal state's continental shelf is
indicated in the comments following the 1951 provisional draft
articles:
"It would seem to serve no purpose to refer to the sea bed
and subsoil of the submarine areas in question as res nullius
capable of being acquired by the first occupier. That conception might lead to chaos. . . ." 140
But the fourth recital of the Truman Proclamation which
refers to the compelling need for self-protection, is more than an
implied statement of world conditions. It is also an indication of
a coastal state's demand for security, and an implied reference to a
recognized principle of international law which confers upon each
state the inherent right to take whatever unilateral (or collective)
measures are necessary to provide for its security. 141 To this extent
139
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the Truman Proclamation does refer, though not explicity, to the
right of self-defense.
It should be noted that the proclamation makes no claim to
an extension of territorial waters. However, it does purport to extend
maritime jurisdiction by claiming the right to use the high seas to
the extent necessary, with due deference to the long-established doctrine of freedom of the seas, for the purpose of exploring and exploiting submarine resources of the continental shelf. It is clear that,
even in the absence of such an extension of jurisdiction and control
over its continental shelf, the United States, as well as other coastal
states, would not tolerate mineral exploitation or the building of
"radar islands" or guided missile launching platforms on its shelves
immediately beyond the limit of territorial waters. Both security
and economic considerations render such foreign exploi~ation of a
coastal state's continental shelf intolerable.
(2) Jurisd.iction and control versus sovereignty
The operative part of the Truman Proclamation states that
the government of the United States regards the natural resources of
the subsoil and the sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control. 142
It is appropriat'e at this point to comment upon the various
views which have been expressed among legal scholars as to whether
the United States' assertion of "jurisdiction and control" is the same
as "sovereignty." 143
The use of the carefully selected ter1ninology, "jurisdiction
and control," may have been motivated in part by a circumspect desire
to avoid any possible accusation by unfriendly powers that the United
States was trying to become a submarine imperialist, even while casting
aside the last mantle of imperialism by freeing the Philippines. 14 i
The efforts to avoid such an accusation were generally successful, but
not entirely so. 145
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 Sept. 1945, 59 Stat. 884, 10 Federal
Register 12303.
143
Committee IV of the Geneva Conference (1958) also discussed at some length
the appropriate language to use in defining the rights of the coastal state over
its continental shelf, finally eschewing the term "sovereignty" lest it connote
rights over the superjacent waters in contravention of the doctrine of 'mare
liberum, and approving the term "sovereign rights." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38
(1958). Also see Whiteman, "Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on
the Continental Shelf," 52 A.J.I.L. 629, 636 (1958).
144 Grunder and Livezey, "The Philippines and the United States" (1951), esp.
Ch. XV. The Philippines were grante9- independence 4 July 1946.
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that those who
drafted the Truman Proclamation were desirous of claiming something less than full sovereignty and therefore used not only the terms
"jurisdiction and control" but also claimed only the "natural resources" of the continental shelf rather than the sea bed and subsoil
of the continental shelf itself. The State Department expressed the
vie'v that the Truman Proclamation did not extend United States
sovereignty beyond territorial waters, saying:
"The territorial limits of the United States are precisely
the same as before September 28, 1945, namely, three marine
miles sea ward from the coast. . . ." 146
The United Nations Secretariat took a similar view in its
1950 me1norandum on the Regime of the High Seas; saying that "It
'vould appear wrong to identify with sovereign rights the rights to
the United States continental shelf claimed under the President's
Proclamation." 147
Several legal scholars 'vere of the same opinion. Young
'vrote that "President Truman's proclamation of 1945 made no claim
on behalf of the United States to 'sovereignty,' 'title,' or 'ownership'
of the continental shelf." 148
Sir Cecil Hurst first wrote that "the text of the (Truman)
proclan1ation does not purport to effect any extension of the
sovereignty of the United States." 149 Ho,vever, subsequently in the
same article Hurst admitted that the distinction between the jurisdiction and the exclusive control which are claimed and sovereignty
is so small as to be little more than a question of name, saying:
"One cannot read this Proclamation without feeling that
'vithin the area of its Continental Shelf, the United States
is claiming rights which are as large as sovereignty . . . if
tlie rights claimed over the Continental Shelf and its
146

13 Department of State Bulletin 484 (1945). Also see Selak, "Recent
Developments in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction Under the President's
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resources were called sovereignty, they would be no more
extensive than what are clain1.ed in the Proclamation." 150
It is submitted that the last statements of Sir Cecil Hurst
are correct, namely, that there is no essential difference between sovereignty over the continental shelf and the language "jurisdiction and
control" over the "natural resources'' as used in the Truman Proclamation. Or, to state it another way, it is distinction without a
dif! erence.
W aldock, another distinguished English writer, agreed with
Hurst's later expressions, saying that "the Proclamation looks very
like an act of appropriation." 151 Similarly, Judge Lauterpacht
agreed that the United States Proclamation was an assumption of
sovereignty over the continental shelf, saying:
" . . . while for reasons of its constitutional law and of
attachment to consistency in its diplomatic practice the
United States may have resorted to a terminology intended\
to dispel the appearance of assumption of sovereignty, it
used words and assumed powers which in fact can have no
other result.'' 152
Brierly was of the opinion, also, that "jurisdiction and control'' was equivalent to sovereignty. 153 Vallat concurred, saying that
"'jurisdiction and control' are tantamount to sovereignty." 154 Mouton also agreed, although he expressed some reservation as to the full
equivalency of "jurisdiction and control" and "sovereignty," saying,
"It seems that there is strong evidence that control and jurisdiction
is the same right, or nearly the same right, as sovereignty." 155
Although it seems clear that the words of the Truman Proclamation, "jurisdiction and control" over the "natural resources" of
the continental shelf are the equivalent, or nearly the equivalent of a
claim of sovereignty, the conflict of views is worthy of some elaboration for the following reasons : First, many of the subsequent proclamations of states actually used the term "sovereignty" on the theory
that no more was being claimed than had been claimed by the United
States in claiming "jurisdiction and control." 156
150
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Second, several of the states \vhich did not use the term
"sovereignty" did use alternative language which was as strong, if
not stronger, than the language used by the United States (e.g., the
sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, or the resources thereof,
were said to "belong to" 157 or are "integrated into the," 158 or shall
"be included in the territories of. . . . " 159
Third, the International Law Con1mission spent considerable
time debating the terminology to be used and ultimately changed its
original position. In the provisional draft articles of 1951 the Commission used the terminology "contr ol and jurisdiction," 160 \vhereas
in the revised draft articles of 1953, after having received the criticisms of many states, in addition to the criticisms of some members
of the Commission, those words were changed to the less-timid, though
no more inclusive, term, "sovereign rights." 161
After much debate, the term "sovereign rights" was also used
in the Geneva Convention as a sort of compromise between "control
and jurisdiction" and "sovereignty." 162 It is difficult to see ho'v the
term "sovereign rights" can mean anything less than "sovereignty,"
particularly when the Convention provides that the "coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf exclusive rights for the purpose
of exploring it and exploiting its n atural resources." 163
Basically the problem that could not be resolved in the
minds of those \vho objected to the use of the term "sovereignty"
was that historically and conceptually "sovereignty" was vertical
rather than horizontal. Secondly, some international la \vyers and
government officials have too long thought of international la \V as a
body of static, rigid rules of precise and unchangeable meaning, unrelated to policies as factors and instruments in the guiding and
shaping of decisions for the maximization of values. 164 This preepicontinental seas and continental shelves. This statement is clearly in error,
as a careful reading of the Truman Proclamation will show. Yet the Decree
indicates that Argentina was considering the United States claim to "jurisdiction and control" as being the equivalent to a claim of "sovereignty."
157
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occupation 'vith concepts and rules which were perhaps valid for the
past but which are no longer adequate for contemporary conditions,
has given to the term "sovereignty" the connotation of (a) "vertical
o'vnership," meaning that he who owned the land mass also owned
to the center of the earth and to the sky, and (b) the connotation of
"absoluteness" meaning that sovereignty is exclusive and complete,
never partial or dual or subject to the slightest derogation. U nquestionably this thinking resulted in the hesitancy of some states, including the United States, 165 to use the term "sovereignty" in claiming
the continental shelf or the resources thereof.
As previously indicated, although Hurst concluded that the
'vords "jurisdiction and control" in the United States Proclamation
'vere the same as "sovereignty," 166 he 'vas troubled by the fact that a
declaration of sovereignty over the continental shelf would create a
line which made a "gigantic zigzag" and hence would conflict with
the neat little notion that sovereignty was "vertical." He wr~te:
" . . . Hitherto it has, I believe, been generally assumed that
the lilnit of a State's sovereignty is a vertical straight line
stretching up,vards and downwards ad infinitum from the
starting point. Was the Continental Shelf policy intended
to introduce a new syste1n? A system under which the ·limits
of a State's sovereignty would be a line \vhich made a gigantic
zigzag. . . . " 167
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the concept that
sovereignty is "vertical"; it can be both vertical and horizontal, the
same as it can be and often is dual, as well as singular. It can be
exclusive as to the utilization o£ a resource (e.g., the exclusive right
of a coastal state to fish in territorial waters or exploit its continental
shelf), at the same time and yet subject to the overriding needs of
the world community in that such sovereignty must accommodate
itself to the inclusive uses demanded by other states, such as the right
of innocent passage in territorial waters, and the right of navigation,
fishing, scientific research, etc., in areas of the high se,as occupied by
continental shelf installations of the coastal state. In short, the idea
of sovereignty de1nands respect but not reverence, deference but not
deification.
One of the more creative thil).kers among international law-'
yers has suggested the idea of "horizontal" sovereignty/68 and others
Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 143 (at 629, 636).
Hurst, op. cit., footnote 149 (at 149).
167
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subsequently have given support to the idea that the delimiting line
of a state's sovereignty 1night "zigzag" a little. 169
c. Claims of States Subsequent to the Truman Proclamation.
Enough has been said of the Truman Proclamation to permit a
comparative analysis of several of the representative types of claims
by states to their continental shelves, and, often, to the fisheries resources of the superjacent waters. The discussion of many of these
claims to the continental shelf will involve some overlap "rith a discussion of state practice relative to territorial 'vaters and the attempted extension thereof to distances up to 200 n1iles fro1n shore.
The United States claim opened the bidding on the continental
shelf in 1945. Several of the states which have followed the United
States lead have doubled and, in a few cases, re-doubled the original
bid. Many subsequent claims, although they either expressly or impliedly refer to the Tru1nan Proclamation as precedent, go far beyond
its scope.
The Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf was, as we
have seen, couched in terms of "jurisdiction and control," and avoided
a claim of "sovereignty" 170 or "title." Moreover, the companion fisheries proclamation did not claim exclusive rights in the natural resources of the sea contiguous to the United States, nor did it refer
either expressly or by implication to the United States continental
shelf. 171 By contrast several of the subsequent clai1ns of other states
asserted sovereignty not only over the continental shelf but also over
the superjacent waters as well.
In general the claims made subsequent to the Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf may be grouped under three classifications: (1) those with a precise depth limit; (2) those with a precise
width limit, regardless of depth; and ( 3) those effecting ,an indeterminarte extension of sovereignty, the extent of the claim not being
precise either as to width or depth of superjacent 'vaters. Representative claims under each classification will be analyzed.
(1) Claims to continental shelf with a precise depth limit of
superjacent waters. A number of states, including Mexico, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Pakistan, have asserted this type of claim, a fe'v
of which will be discussed.
Scarcely a month after the Truman Procla1nation, the President of Mexico issued a declaration asserting Mexican control over
the contiguous continental shelf, describing the shelf as bounded "by
169
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the 'isobath,' that is, the line joining points at the same depth (200
metres)." 172 The Mexican clain1 says that "this shelf clearly forms
an integral part of continental countries," and goes on to enu1nerate
some of the resources contained in the shelf-"natural resources,
liquid and gaseous minerals, phosphates, calcium, hydrocarbons, etc."
of inestimable value "'vhose legal incorporation into the national property is urgent and cannot be delayed." 173
Although not claiming control and jurisdiction over the pelagic
fisheries off her coasts, Mexico did suggest that she ·,vas "taking steps
to supervise, utilize and control the closed fishing zones necessary for
the conservation of this source of wellbeing," declaring that the protection should consist of the extension of control and supervision
irrespective of the distance from the coast. 174
Thus, while the l\1exican claiin to the continental shelf 'vas
expressed in terms of the depth of the superjacent waters (i.e., 200
meters) there was no coin parable limitation fixed for the width of
anticipated pelagic fisheries zones of protection, nor did Mexico limit
such zones to the superjacent 'vaters above her continental shelves.
The Mexican claini in regard to her establishment of closed fishing
zones 'vas tempered by a subsequent statement recognizing the "lawful rights of third parties based on reciprocity" and indicating that
the rights of free navigation on the high seas 'vere not affected.
In February 1951, Ecuador issued a decree which was labeled
as relating to territorial 'vaters, but which proclaimed sovereignty
over the continental shelf 'vith a precise depth limit of 200 meters of
superjacent waters marking the outer edge. The decree also established a fisheries protection zone in the high seas corresponding to
this she] f (i.e., the protection zone was related to the shelf as
defined) .175
In addition, the decree specified a territorial sea of 12 nautical
1niles but the inference to be dra 'vn from the total document "'aS
that Ecuador purported to extend her territorial sea to include all
'vaters covering the continental shelf. As was to be expected, both
the United States and the United l{ingdom filed protests. 176
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In August 1952 Ecuador made her claim to sovereignty over
the adjacent Inaritime zone even more emphatic and precise-this
tin1e precise as to width rather than depth of the superjacent watersby joining with Chile and Peru in signing the Declaration of Santiago claiming 200 miles of high seas and pledging collaboration for
the protection of marine resources in the area. 177 Chile and Peru
had individually made such extensive claims in 1947. 178 United
States efforts to conc1ude agreements with Chile, Ecuador and Peru
to modify these 200-mile claims to sovereignty over the seas adjacent
to their coasts have met with failure. 179
(2) Claims with a precise -width limit of superjacent waters.
The second classification of claims is that which specifies a precise
'vidth limit of high seas without reference to the depth of the superjacent waters over the continental shelf and, in many cases, even in
the absence of a shelf in the geological sense. This type of claim has
been asserted by a number of states, particularly the Latin American
states of Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. !Corea
and Saudi Arabia have also asserted claims based upon a precise
'vidth of high seas.
Typical are the claims of Chile and Peru which, as previously
indicated, asserted their sovereignty over a belt of the high seas extending 200 miles from their coasts. The Proclamation of Chile in
1947 announced that the government
". . . proclaims and confirms its national sovereignty over all
the continental shelf adjacent to the continental and island
coasts of its national territory whatever may be their depth
below the sea." 180
The Chilean proclamation then claimed ". . . national soverei~nty over the seas adjacent to its coasts whatever may be
their depths, and within those limits necessary in order toreserve, protect, preserve and exploit the natural resources of
whatever nature found on, \vithin and belo\v the said seas ...
at a distance of 200 nautical1niles from the coasts of Chilean
territory." 181
A similar zone was also claimed on all sides of Chile's island
possessions.
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Although the Chilean proc ._--- l' ion repudiated any intent to
affect "the legitimate rights of otl ~l.- ,~ ~ates on a basis of reciprocity"
and "the rights of free navigation on tl1e high seas," it is clear that the
claim to sovereignty over the high seas does constitute a complete
and unjustified departure from international law. This departure
was stressed by the United States Government in its note of 2 July
1948, to Chile, protesting the extensive claims, saying:
"In these respects, the United States Government notes
in particular that ( 1) the Chilean Declaration confirms and
proclaims the national sovereignty of Chile over the continental shelf and over the seas adjacent to the coast of Chile
outside the generally accepted limits of territorial waters,
and (2) the Declaration fails, with respect to fishing, to
accord appropriate and adequate recognition to the rights
and interests of the United States in the high seas off the
coast of Chile." 182
·
The principal reason advanced by Chile for the departure in
the proclamation from generally accepted principles of international
law is geological, as she emphasized in her elaborate comments on
the 1951 provisional draft articles of the International Law Commission.183 The continental shelf, in the strict geological sense, is so
narrow and precipitous off the Chilean coast that a claim based upon
a depth limit o:f 200 meters would have given Chile little by way of
new resources over what she could already claim in the submarine
areas beneath a three-mile territorial sea. 184
The Chilean proclamation, therefore, lays claim to resources
of vast areas of submarine territory and high seas which in reality
have no relation to the continental shelf in terms of the generally
accepted geological concept of a 200- meter depth limit. The submarine territory claimed is not the continental shelf but the continental slopes and deep ocean basins out to 200 miles from shore. In
addition, Chile claims the fisheries above said slopes and deep ocean
basins. Yet, her claim to the "continental shelf" is consistent with
the depth-o:f-exploitability test in the Geneva Convention and will
become meaningful when the world's technology permits the exploitation of resources from these and other continental slopes and deep
ocean basins.
In her comments to the International Law Commission on the
1951 provisional draft articles, Chile said
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" ... there should be
Iirmation of the right to estabfishing zone 200 sea miles wide
lish an exclusive huntin
... based on the followj
"sons : ( 1) the special configuration of the submarine sl , _ _ong the coasts of Chile; ( 2) the
exploitation of the fisheries, which are of vital concern to
Chile; ( 3) the inadequacy of three miles of territorial sea for
protecting the fishing industry and preventing destruction of
marine life; and ( 4) the improper jurisdiction exercised in
the past and present by certain foreign vessels over Chilean
fishermen, whose living comes mainly from the sea." 185
Moreover, Chile also argued that since other Latin American
countries had followed the Chilean lead, a new doctrine of "continental seas or waters" (i.e., the right of each state unilaterally to
determine the breadth of its territorial sea) had become part of internationallaw.186 Finally, the Chilean proclamation defended the 200mile claims in terms of the importance of fisheries to the economic life
of the country, saying
" . . . in view of its topography and the narrowness of its
boundaries, the life of the country is linked to the sea and to
all present and future natural riches contained within it, more
so than in the case of any other country." 187
Recent studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization indicate that Chile may have overstated the importance
of fisheries to her total economy. Chile is not listed among the
fourteen leading countries whose product of sea fisheries is as much
as one per cent or more of the aggregate domestic product, nor is she
listed among the seventeen leading countries whose sea fishery landings
are as much as $500 or more per capita of national income per year.188
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always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the
will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is
true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the
coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with
regard to other States depends upon international law." I.O.J. Reports 116, 132
(1951).
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While it was valid for Chile to have disregarded her meager
and in some cases non-existent continental shelf, geologically speaking, in establishing fisheries protection zones/89 it was completely contrary to international law, as well as contrary to her own long-run
interests, for her to have claimed sovereignty over a 200-mile belt of
adj.acent seas for the protection of fisheries. These claims of sovereignty over high seas fisheries are reminiscent of the attempts of
Spain, Portugal and the Scandina vi an States three centuries ago to
establish sovereignty over areas of the high seas in order to monopolize
trade and fishing, 190 attempts which gradually failed under the
constant pressure of various Inaritime states for the establishment of
freedom o:f the seas 191 and the eventual realization that the greatest
benefit to all states would ensue from the widest possible sharing of
this great common resource.
Yet, while emphasizing the invalidity of Chile's claim to
sovereignty over a 200-mile band of high seas adjacent to her coasts,
it is only fair to protest against some of the more intemperate criticisms of the Chilean action which impute bad faith to Chile, suggesting that she "may justly be suspected of employing the continental
shelf as protective cover for assertions of a wholly different
character." 192
There is no more justification for suggesting that Chile
employed the continental shelf as "protective cover for assertions of a
wholly different character," than there would be for a similar suggesttion as to the United States claim to fisheries conservation zones, even
assuming that the United States had combined her two proclamations
(fisheries conservation and continental shelf) into a single document,
as did Chile.
189

The United States proclamation establishing fisheries conservation zones,
issued on the same day as the United States proclamation on the continental
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said zones to 200 miles from shore, as did the Chilean proclamation, but specified
zones "in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United
States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed
and maintained on a substantial scale." (Presidential Proclamation No. 2668,
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A careful reading of the Chilean proclamation reveals that the
specification of width is in the paragraph referring to the protection
zones for whaling and deep sea fisheries in the "continental and island
seas," and not in the paragraph which relates to the claim of national
sovereignty over the continental shelf in which t here is no assertion
of width but only a disclaimer of depth under superjacent waters as
the criterion for limiting a coastal state's rights to the resources in and'
under (not above) said shelf.193
Moreover, the comments of the Government of Chile to the
International Law CommisHion indicate that she was not trying to use
the continental shelf doctrine as a "guise" or "protective cover" for
claiming sovereignty over the fisheries zones out to 200 miles from
shore. On the contrary, Chile clearly recognized that she had a narrow and in some cases a non -existent continental shelf in terms of the
geological concept of a 200-meter depth limit. For this reason she
argued strongly for the depth-of-exploitability test for the continental
shelf, rather than the fixed depth limit, citing on her behalf the Commission's own 1950 report that "where the depth of the waters permitted exploitation, it should not necessarily depend on the existence
of a continental shelf." 194
The Chilean position in regard to the conservation of fisheries
is therefore consistent in the following respect. If the legitimate
claims to the resources of the sea bed and subsoil of the contiguous
submarine areas are not dependent upon the existence of a continental
shelf, defined by a 200-meter depth limit, then it is logical to argue
that the right of a coastal state to protect, or at least participate in the
protection of, pelagic fisheries resources in the contiguous zone, whatever its width, is not dependent upon the existence of a continental
shel£.195
. However, Chile claimed more than the right to protect fisheries
resources in cooperation with other states; she claimed sov,ereignty
over the high seas for this purpose. Although she acknowledged the
"legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity ... " and
the "rights of free navigation on the high seas" 196 her exclusive claim
is considerably greater than the United States inclusive claim of the
right of "regulation and control" in certain "explicitly bounded con193
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servation zones," with full recognition of the rights of other states to
fish in said zones.197
It is not the prerogative of Chile or of any other state to specify
and limit the "legitimate (fishing) rights of other States on a basis of
reciprocity." Such fishing rights outside of territorial waters, like
the rights of navigation, belong to all states under the doctrine of
freedom of the seas. The Convention on the High Seas provides
that "the high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty."198 A similar
provision is contained in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.199
It follows, therefore, that the 200-mile claim of Chile, like
those of the other countries 'vhich have attempted to extend their territorial seas beyond three miles, thereby limiting the rights of other
states to fish in those extended areas, is contrary to customary internationalla w and to the implied limitations within specific provisions
of the Geneva Conventions.
The United States proclamation relative to fisheries explicitly
provides that
" . . . where such activities have been or shall hereafter be
legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals
of the United States and nationals of other States, explicitly
bounded conservation zones may be established under agreements between the United States and such other States, and
all fishing activities in such zones shall be subj~ct to regulation and control as provided in such agreements." 200
This provision makes a much greater concession to other
states than does the Chilean proclamation which only recognizes the
"legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity." The
United States proclamation is therefore specific as to how the rights
of other states are to be recognized and sets forth the procedures (i.e.,
through agreements) for resolving conflicts and establishing regulations and controls under the aegis of several states rather than under
the exclusive control of the United States.
It is worth emphasizing that the United States does not contemplate emclusive control of ,the fisheries conservation zones, nor is sovereignty claimed over any part of the high seas, the proclamation pro-,
viding t hat "the character as high seas of the areas in which such con197
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servation zones are established and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no 'vay thus affected." 201
a. Summary and conclusions in regard to 0 hilean claims.
1. The Chilean claim to sovereignty over her continental
shelf, defining the shelf in ter1ns of depth-o:f-exploitability rather than
a 200-meter depth limit was entirely valid, no less valid than the claim
of the United States to exclusive jurisdiction and control over her continental shelves and entirely consistent "\vith the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
2. The Chilean claim to sovereignty over a 200-mile belt of
adjacent high seas for purposes of fishing was invalid and contrary to
customary international la,v, and the implied limitations of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1958, as 'vell as being contrary to the long-run
interests of Chile and other coastal states in developing and conserving
fisheries and in exploiting other uses of the high seas.
3. Some of the criticisms of Chile are unwarranted, particularly those which impute to her bad faith in using the continental shelf
doctrine as a "guise" for claiming exclusive fishing rights.
Peru, located to the north of Chile and finding herself in
essentially the same geographical and geological situation, that is,
without any continental shelf to speak of, issued a presidential decree
in August 1947,202 only a little more than a month after the Chilean
declaration. Peru modeled her decree after her neighbor's except for
one important difference. The Peruvian decree made no mention of
the legitimate rights of other States to fish in her conservation zone on
a "basis of reciprocity." For this reason the Peruvian decree is even
more objectionable than the Chilean declaration with respect to
fisheries.
The United States protest, couched generally in the languag~ used in the protest to Chile, objected (1) to the Peruvian claim
of sovereignty over the continental shelf and the seas adjacent to the
coast of Peru outside the generally accepted limit of territorial waters,
and (2) to the failure, with respect to fishing, to accord recognition to
the rights and interests of the United States in the high seas off the
coasts of Peru.203
Another claim worthy of comment is that of El Salvador,
which in simple, brief, and inclusive language made the sweeping assertion that its territory included "the adjacent seas to a distance of t'vo
201
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hundred sea miles from low water line and the corresponding air space,
subsoil and continental shelf." 204
A subsequent paragraph provided that "the provisions of
the foregoing paragraph shall not affect the freedom of navigation in
accordance with the principles recognized under International
La\v." 205 This provision was comparable to the one in Peru's decree in
that no mention was made of the rights of other nations, reciprocally, to
fish in the 200-mile belt of adjacent seas.
The United States sent a stronger note of protest to El
Salvador than \Vas the case with Chile and Peru, probably for t\vo
important reasons: (1) El Salvador claimed sovereignty, not only
over the 200-mile adjacent seas, but over the corresponding air space.
Sovereignty 'vas claimed, the United States protest pointed out, despite the subsequent disclai1ner by El Salvador that her claim did not
affect the "freedom of navigation" on the seas., and in the air. (2)
Secondly, no indication was given by El Salvador that her claim to
the 200-mile adjacent seas was for the purpose of establishing a
fisheries protection and conservation zone. Instead, this broad expanse of high seas was stated to be part of the "territory" of the
Republic.
The claim of El Salvador was rightly opposed by the United
States.
(3) Olaims affecting an indeterminate extension of sovereignty
over adjacent submarine area and high seas.
Representative of this type of claim are those of Argentina,
Israel, and Australia. Barely a year after the Truman Proclamation,
President Peron issued a decree "concerning national sovereignty
over epicontinental sea and the Argentine continental shelf." 206 It
declared the epicontinental sea and continental shelf to be "subject to
the sovereign power of the nation." 207 However, in an attempt to
follow the pattern of the Truman Proclamations regarding the continental shelf and fisheries conservation zones, the Argentine decree
provided that
". . . for the purposes of free navigation, the character of the
waters situated in the Argentine epicontinental sea and
above the Argentine continental shelf, remains unaffected by
the present Declaration." 208
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The Argentine decree nowhere defines the shelf or delimits
the area claimed. It has been suggested that the reason for this failure to delimit the shelf may be related to her Antarctic claims.
Young points out that the Falkland Islands, to which both Argentina
and Great Britain lay claim, are located on the South American
continental shelf, even under the 100 fathom definition . 209
The above suggestion appears to have merit for two reasons :
First, the United States, in her protest to Argentina took special care
to point out that the "reservations thus made . . . are not intended to
have relation to or to prejudice any Argentine claims with reference
to the Antarctic Continent or other land areas." 210 Secondly, the
British declaration with regard to her own claims to the continental
shelf of the Falkland Islands may be viewed as a counter move to the
S"\veeping Argentine claim. 211
Using essentially the same language that was used in the protests to Chile and Peru, the United States protested the Argentine
decree on the ground that it was "at variance with the generally accepted principles of international law." 212 Several writers h ave also
criticized the extensiveness of Argentina's claims which, like those
of Chile, Peru and other Latin American countries, assert a greater
degree of sovereignty over the epicontinental seas than is justified in
view of the long-established rights of all states to fish in the high
seas.
Of special interest in this classification of claims to the continental shelf involving a categorical extension of sovereignty without a precise limit on the basis of either depth or width of superjacent
waters are the claims of Israel (1952) 213 and Australia (1953). 214
The Israel claim is significant for two reasons : ( 1) First, the
Israeli Government refused to use the term "continental shelf,"
despite its widespread use by the International Law Commission and
by writers, preferring instead the term "submarine areas." (2)
Secondly, the Israel claim explicitly avoided a definition or delimitation of the submarine area in terms of a precise depth or width, using
instead the depth-of-exploitability criterion of the Commission's
1951 provisional draft articles.
209
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It could have been anticipated from statements made prior to
the issuance of her proclamation that Israel would eschew the use of
the term "continental shelf" and would not delimit her claims by
using the 200-meter limit. Her government commented as follows:
" ... The legal definition of the concept of the continental
shelf should be divorced from the geological and scientific
definition. That being so, the Commission's reasons for
retaining the term 'continental shelf' are not. seen to be convincing, and a phrase such as 'submarine areas' is considered
preferable." 215
Although the Israel proclamation does not use the term "sovereignty," there is no doubt from the language, which says that the
territory of Israel is ewtended to include the sea bed and subsoil of
the submarine area, that the intent was to claim full sovereignty over
the continental shelf.
Unlike the separate fisheries proclamation of the United States,
or the proclamation of so many of the Latin American countries
which combined their claims to the continental shelf and high seas
fisheries, the Israel proclamation claimed only the resources of the
submarine areas. A disclaimer clause was included saying that the
elaim to the submarine areas in no way "shall affect the character
as high seas"'· above the submarine areas. 216 Differing sharply from
most of the Latin American claims, the Israel proclamation reserved
the rights of other states both as to navigation and fisheries, rather
than to navigation alone.
Two Australian proclamations issued 10 September 1953
claimed the Australian continental shelf, and that of the Trusteeship
Territory of New Guinea. 217 Neither of these proclamations defines
or delimits the continental shelf. For example, the proclamation
relating to the Australian continental shelf says,
". . . Australia has sovereign rights over the sea bed and
subsoil of (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of
its coasts. . . ." 218
Just why Australia did not specify a precise depth limit for
the continental shelf in her proclamation is puzzling in view of the
fact that contemporaneously 'vith the publication of the two procU.N. Doc. A/2456, 59 (1953).
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lamations an act was passed by the Australian Parliament, amending
the Pearl Fisheries Act of 1952. This Act did define the continental
shelf of Australia as
". . . the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coasts of Australia and of the submarine are as
contiguous to the coasts of the Territories, to a depth o:f not
more than one hundred fathoms." 219
O'Connell admitted that the Australian proclarnations lacked
precision as to limits, but explained that this was done purposely because the continental shelf "possesses the potentiality of expansion
with the advance in techniques of exploitation of the sea bed." 220
Yet, he referred with favor to the amending legislation relative to
pearl fisheries which, as indicated above, did provide for a delimitation of the continental shelf according to the 100 fathom criterion.
It is not easy to follow the arguments of O'Connell nor to
understand the ambivalent position of Australia which on the one
hand (i.e., in the continental shelf proclamations) denied the need
for defining or delimiting the continental shelf because of the shelf's
potentiality of expansion with the advance in techniques of exploitation of the sea bed, while on the other hand making a claim through
contemporaneous legislation relating to pearl fisheries, for the purpose
of excluding the Japanese pearling fleet from a submarine area,
which precisely defined the shelf in terms of a 100 fathom depth limit.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the pearl
fisheries amending act which defined the continental shelf in terms of
a precise depth limit did so for the purposes of the Act. Hence, for
the purpose of excluding the Japanese (and other) pearling fleets from
the submarine areas adjacent to Australian coasts the continental
shelf __is one thing, defined and delimited, whereas for all other purposes and for all other claims by Australia the continental shelf is
another thing, undefined and not delimited by the depth-of-exploitability criterion.
These dual definitions of the continental shelf by Australia are
the only ones encountered so far. 221 It would be unfortunate if the
219
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Australian 1nodel 'vere follo,ved by other states because it would only
add confusion to the establishment of the continental shel:f doctrine
in international law. It is surprising, indeed, that O'Connell should
argue on the one hand that "it is this lack of precision in the various
continental shelf claims that has provided a stumbling-block to the
development of the law," 222 while at the same time defending the lack
of precision in the Australian proclamations.
4. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis indicates some divergence in the extent of
the clain1s by states to their continental shelves. However, the greatest divergence occurs in the assertions of states to varying degrees of
control and jurisdiction, including unabashed claims of sovereignty,
over the fisheries and other resources of the high seas above or beyond
the continental shelf.
Because of the disagree1nents which developed after 1945 as a
result of the excessive claims by some states over high seas fisheries
resources, it is fortunate indeed that the International Law Commission undertook a systematic study of the regime of the high seas in
all of its 1najor aspects, resulting in the formulation of a set of 73
draft articles. Six of these draft articles, with few modifications,
'vere incorporated into the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf.
Most of the proclamations and decrees issued after the Truman
Proclamation of 1945 referred to the measures previously adopted by
other states as proof of an emerging international doctrine and
practice with respect to the continental shelf. Admittedly it is debatable as to when such international doctrine and practice became
established as a part of customary international law, just as it is
difficult to know when a route across a commons acquires "the character of an acknowledged path." 223
Although it is a matter of opinion as to exactly when the parade of
proclamations on the continental shelf developed a path which was
not only discernible, but well-defined and acknowledged, it seems clear
and indisputable that the path has now been established; the practice
of states in regard to the continental shelf has become a part of
customary international law. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf in effect was declaratory of this new customary
international law; one may even say that the Convention codified the
newly-established law of the Continental Shelf.
While it is 'true that the 46 states which signed the Convention are
not bound by it until after they have ratified it and it will not become
222
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effective until the twenty-second ratification or accession, the Convention is a persuasive statement of the present law of the continental
shelf. In any controversy 'vhich may arise between states which
have signed the Convention, or even between states which have not
signed it, the judicial or arbitral body called upon to resolve the
particular dispute should give it great weight.
In addition to the Convention's significant probative value in disputes which may arise, it will serve as a useful guide to state practice
in the exploitation of continental shelf resources. As Miss Whiteman
has said,
" . . . regardless of the number of its ratifications and accessions, the Convention, together with the greatly similar 1956
International Law Commission draft on the same subject,
will, in the future, doubtless have considerable influence on
the content and direction of the developing international law
with respect to the continental shelf." 2'24
This is not to say that the articles of the Convention are so clear
and final that they provide a ready answer to all disputes which may
develop between states, or between competing claimants within a state
(i.e., continental shelf exploitation versus fisheries, navigation, etc.).
On the contrary, it is to be anticipated that some of the Articles may
prove to be inadequate, necessitating subsequent modification.
Finally, it is to be hoped that in interpreting and applying the
articles of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, as well
as the three companion Conventions of 1958, writers, arbiters, judges,
statesmen, and others will weigh the balance of decision in favor of
inclusive rather than ewclusive uses 225 to the end that the coastal
state's exercise of its exclusive rights to exploit the resources of the
contjp.ental shelf will interfere as little as possible with navigation,
communication, fishing, scientific investigation, and all other inclusive
uses of the high seas by the 'vorld community of states.
224

Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 143 (at 629, 659).
McDougal & Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspective
Versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539, 588 (1958).
225

